

# bulletin





# *The Department of State* bulletin

VOL. XXI, No. 527 • PUBLICATION 3604

August 8, 1949

*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department, as well as legislative material in the field of international relations, are listed currently.*

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

**PRICE:**

52 issues, domestic \$6, foreign \$8.50

Single copy, 20 cents

The printing of this publication has been approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (February 18, 1949).

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August

## Multilateral Diplomacy

by William Sanders<sup>1</sup>

Despite the imposing and perhaps enigmatic title, this subject has become commonplace the world over with the advent of the League of Nations and the United Nations.

These two international organizations represent the maximum efforts made by the nations of the world to establish peace and to promote human welfare through organized collective cooperation. It is within the large context of the methods and objectives of these international activities that multilateral diplomacy has its complete meaning. In placing the adjective "multilateral" before the noun "diplomacy" we thereby give recognition to one of the most significant developments of our time. Multilateral diplomacy is a revolutionary method for dealing with international affairs. Beyond that, it is revolutionary in the policies and subject matters of such affairs.

It is not enough to say, therefore, that bilateral diplomacy involves negotiations between two states whereas multilateral diplomacy, as it literally connotes, involves negotiations between and among many states. Like the iceberg, such a definition leaves much undisclosed beneath the surface.

The principal example of multilateral diplomacy today on a world scale is the United Nations.<sup>2</sup> Together with the specialized agencies in the economic, social, and cultural fields, the

United Nations is a complex of organizations, committees, commissions, working groups, international meetings, and conferences. Most of these bodies and meetings are composed of, or are attended by, official representatives of governments. Membership and attendance in some cases is confined to technical experts, who serve in their individual or professional capacity. Normally all these bodies and gatherings are serviced by secretariats composed of international public servants.

But multilateral diplomacy is something more than machinery and procedure. International organizations and the procedures and techniques by which they operate are simply the means by which states seek to arrive at and give effect to an agreed uniform or common policy. In the case of the United Nations this policy is found in the Charter, particularly its principles and purposes. The specialized organizations in the economic and social fields such as the World Health Organization, the Food and Agricultural Organization, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, have similar constitutional statements of policy and objectives in their technical areas. These documents are written foreign policy statements of the individual states.

The singularity of this policy does not arise alone in that it is a uniform or common policy stated collectively by many states, or that it creates permanent international machinery to facilitate the execution of this policy, or in that its basic principles and purposes are stated in written form in an international document. This policy is also characterized by the fact that it covers virtually all aspects of foreign affairs, and that in many of

<sup>1</sup>This article is based on remarks made before the Washington Students Citizenship Seminar, held at the Department of State on June 28, 1949.

<sup>2</sup>For an analysis of an older, regional example of multilateral diplomacy see "Sovereignty and Independence in the New World," *BULLETIN* of Feb. 8, 1948, p. 155.



these aspects it is contractual, that is, binding on the member states.

The United Nations Charter, for example, covers the entire range of foreign policy. At San Francisco when the Charter was drafted, there was stubborn insistence that the United Nations should go beyond the Covenant of the League of Nations in the field of economic and social cooperation. In the more than 5,000 meetings held yearly by the United Nations system, the entire span of the life of man is considered in the effort to free him from fear and want. This program includes many matters which until only recently were considered of purely domestic concern.

The contractual aspect of multilateral diplomacy involves not only obligations to abide by certain standards of conduct and to join with other states in cooperative endeavors for the promotion of human welfare and peace, but also obligations to carry out in good faith the decisions of the security organ of the international organization.

Many aspects of this multilateral policy are of course stated only in terms of broad principles or objectives; the action to be taken is not specified. The action to be taken, and how and when it is to be taken, is left for decision by the member states. Action can be taken individually by each state or under special agreements or treaties with other states. The European Recovery Program represents action of this kind. Action can be taken, and more generally is, on the basis of studies and recommendations of the appropriate organ or organizations of the United Nations system. The proposed Covenant on Human Rights and the work of the Economic and Social Council are of that type of international organization activities which lays the basis for internal and international action by the members. A very large proportion of the responsibilities of the United Nations system within its vast frame of reference is discharged through the exercise of its purely consultative and recommendatory functions.

Other matters of interstate relations involve obligations under the Charter to do or not to do certain things. Typical of these are the commitments to settle international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force. The Charter system for the settlement of disputes is extremely flexible and seeks principally to encourage and facilitate agreement between the parties involved rather than to impose solutions. In the

case of the International Court of Justice, where the judgment of the Court is binding on the parties, the initial decision to utilize this method of settlement is up to the parties. In the case of the Security Council and General Assembly, which may consider a dispute or situation regardless of the wishes of the parties, the functions of pacific settlement are those of political negotiation and compromise, in which the final decision is in the hands of the parties involved. Nevertheless, a recommendation of the Security Council or the General Assembly relative to a dispute or a situation affecting the peace passed by the required majority of the members, directly engages the responsibility and good faith of the members to proceed with due regard for the recommended course of action. This is a responsibility not only of the states who may be directly involved in the question but also of the other member states. Thus in the case of the General Assembly resolution on Spain, the United States has taken the position that although it has never considered the resolution as an altogether effective or realistic means by which to encourage the emergence of a Spanish government more representative of the people of Spain, the United States will observe the terms of the resolution so long as it is on the books.

It is in matters relating to the prevention or suppression of breaches of the peace that discretion by the member states on the manner of and timing for the carrying out of an obligation under the Charter is at a minimum. It is in this area that under the Charter the state who violates the self-denying obligations to refrain from the use of force can be compelled by the Security Council to keep the peace; it is also in this area where the other members are obligated to "accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council" on the enforcement of peace.

Multilateral diplomacy thus creates, and operates in increasingly within, an organized community of states. In this community are to be found at different stages of development the institutions, laws, regulations, and even the mores typical of all community association. The United Nations system has all these elements. The legislative, or more properly speaking, the deliberative is typified preeminently by the General Assembly; the judicial is typified by the International Court of Justice; and the executive is exemplified on the



highest political plane by the Security Council and on the administrative plane by the Secretariat.

In its operation, multilateral diplomacy combines bilateral, group, and parliamentary negotiations. The preparations for and the conduct of the General Assembly of the United Nations illustrate this point. The Assembly is the macrocosm of international parliamentary processes.

Attendance at the General Assembly session means for the Government of the United States an extraordinary amount of careful planning and painstaking studies and the making of significant policy decisions on a great variety of issues. On many of the more important of these issues consultation with Congressional leaders is held. On others the participation of a considerable number of Government agencies is required. Many of these agencies have been concerned traditionally only with matters of domestic concern. They are now brought into the international picture in connection with the activities of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the specialized agencies in the economic, social, and cultural field. The vital role of public opinion in the United States, moreover, calls for consultations with private organizations and individuals to obtain their views in the preparation of instructions to the United States delegation.

Another phase of this preparatory work involves diplomatic conversations with governments on issues of mutual interest. By this means the Department of State attempts to convey to these governments the views of this government and to obtain their views. Through this reciprocal and informal "give and take" an early mutual understanding of views and attitudes is made possible which frequently facilitates the discussions in the Assembly. These discussions of course continue during the Assembly as an accompaniment of the multilateral discussions in the working groups, subcommittees, committees, and plenary meetings. To facilitate these informal and individual discussions, the United States delegation has attached to it special "political liaison officers" whose job it is to contact the other delegates in order to receive their views and to pass on to them the views of the United States delegation. All these mutations of unilateral preparations and decisions, bilateral discussions, and multilateral negotiations

are part and parcel of the whole complex of multilateral diplomacy. They are and should be part of the normal and routine mechanism by which agreement is reached in the "Parliament of the World."

These negotiations do not yield the sum or average of our bilateral relations. Someone has stated somewhat ambiguously, but not inaptly, that the process by which agreement is reached in the United Nations constitutes a new dimensional diplomacy. In direct negotiations between two countries, there is always a degree of bargaining on a selective basis, permitting, among other things, the offsetting of matters of mutual interest. In multilateral negotiations, this bargaining situation is out of focus. States are projected into issues in which they have no immediate or direct interest and where they have consequently greater latitude for "free wheeling." The rapid tempo and fluidity of these negotiations, moreover, place a premium on individual initiative and discretion. There is even latitude for individual idiosyncrasy and temperament. Quick decisions on the spot must be made. The representatives are also exposed to personal and psychological pressures of a great public forum and to other special regional or group interests operating within the Assembly itself which offset or diffuse the normal bilateral negotiating situation. That is why, as has been said, an international organization has a personality of its own, distinct from that of its individual members. That is also why the element of leadership is so essential if constructive purposes are to be achieved through the international organization. It also explains why so often the decisions reflect adherence to principles of general and long-range interest rather than the accommodation of purely individual national interests.

As indicated previously the extraordinary range and variety of subjects covered by multilateral negotiations has had a direct and pervasive influence on the conduct of foreign affairs. For one thing, the "shirt sleeve" element has entered into the processes of diplomacy. Because of the "internationalizing" of so many matters formerly of purely domestic concern, diplomacy has had to invoke the participation of specialists, technicians, and professionals in virtually all walks of life. "The butcher, the baker and the candlestick maker," not to speak of "rich man, poor man," though not I hope "beggarman and thief," as such

and not as converts to a little understood diplomatic profession, are now included among those who conduct negotiations as representatives of their governments and as experts on international bodies.

But of still wider ramifications in this connection has been the impact of multilateral diplomacy on the role of public opinion in the conduct of foreign affairs. The new alphabet symbol "NGO" reflects the awakened interest and participation of nongovernmental organizations and private individuals in foreign policy. The public forum characteristic of multilateral diplomacy and the range of matters covered by these negotiations has made this development inevitable. This result had to be true particularly in the United States where foreign policy is so peculiarly responsive to public opinion trends. This development places a premium on an intelligent understanding on the part of the people of international problems and on a discriminate use and evaluation of the facts of international life.

Why is it, it may well be asked at this point, that multilateral diplomacy has acquired such vital significance in our time? Trygve Lie recently said in explaining the role of the United Nations that:

There can be no substitute for the universal approach of the United Nations. There is only one way to prevent a third World War in the long run—the only way is to make the United Nations work on a universal basis.

This categorical statement regarding the universal approach to peace harks back to the deeply felt sentiment which a great proportion of the peoples of the world shared at the end of World War II. It then appeared self-evident that only through collective security based upon a universal system for the peaceful adjustment of conflicts, the enforcement of peace, and on economic and social cooperation could man entertain a hope of freeing himself from recurring war. In the present period of somewhat general skepticism and let-down, these premises are being examined afresh.

Some now say that the United Nations and all it represents is pure idealism, the same idealism, which injected the United States into the First World War under the banner of "making the world safe for democracy." Through the creation of a straw man regarding the supposed role of a wet-behind-the-ears idealism in the creation and

in the failure of the League of Nations, a premise is established which would cut the ground from under the whole concept of collective security. This view disposes of the United Nations as a luxury item, which is not justified by the lean and harsh realities of international life.

Another reason given for the establishment of such institutions as the League of Nations and the United Nations is that they are the product of the fear of war and international anarchy, a fear that has been deepened and accentuated by the catastrophic proportions of modern war, particularly with the advent of weapons of mass destruction. This is a factor where the compulsions for continuing effort, we are told, ebb or flow with the immediacy or remoteness of war.

Another reason given relates to the factor of convenience—that the intensification and broadening of matters of international concern makes it imperative that means be devised by which the states of the world can agree upon and coordinate policies and undertake continuing activities on matters of mutual interest and concern. But convenience by itself, it is evident, has never been a compelling motivation for human action on the scale and magnitude required for the gigantic effort to create permanent peace.

A fourth reason, which may be said to embrace the other three, is based on conclusions which flow from the self-evident and inescapable interdependence of the world. It establishes the proposition that peace and human welfare can be achieved only through collective means. This is an appeal to enlightened self-interest, which cannot be turned aside by failures and cannot easily be disillusioned. It is an appeal that evokes the law of survival in the modern world. This involves not only physical survival, but survival of our way of life and standards of living. The interdependence of the world and the "indivisibility of peace" has been brought home to our people in the two World Wars of this century. The news of the day is constantly reflecting these same realities. Disturbed economic and social situations and internal and international strife in other parts of the world hit us in many obvious and unmistakable ways.

Some welcome these facts; others are made unhappy by them. But whatever one's reaction may be, it is not enough to recognize that these are facts of life. The interdependence of the world is a

factor of environment which in and by itself will not force a given course of action upon the nations of the world. As usual in dealing with factors of environment, we have alternatives. We can remain passive, we can adapt, or we can control, for good or for evil. Interdependence can be responsible for our destruction or it can be used to our advantage. It does impose one inexorable condition—in the long run we cannot have peace and we cannot have and continue to develop our high levels of living in isolation from the rest of the world. This truism was stated by President Roosevelt in 1933 when he said: "No nation or group of nations can enjoy prosperity and plenty when a large part of the world is in economic stress."

From this point of vantage, history and the analysis of the nature of a world composed of independent and sovereign states compels the conclusion that older forms of power relations are outdated and inadequate for our present needs. This conclusion applies specifically to isolationism, alliances, spheres of influence, world domination on the Roman model, exclusive reliance on national strength and balance of power. These older systems may be justified in retrospect as proper rules of a Neanderthal game of survival in a lawless world. Certainly insofar as the United States is concerned it can not be denied that from the earliest colonial period up to recent times it has been a beneficiary of and occasional active participant in balance of power. This system gave the world periods of unstable and uneasy peace and was used to oppose aggression and world domination. Nevertheless, it evolved within a "dog-eat-dog" frame of reference. The essential reason for being of one group was its antagonism to another such group. The theoretical basis of the system was the fiction of balance of power; the real objective of the practices under it was of course preponderance of power. Under this system security was a product of preponderance and not of equilibrium. But by the same token security for one group meant lack of security for the other. This practice engendered offsetting power arrangements with an armed clash the inevitable outcome. There is still in some quarters a nostalgic attachment to the *laissez-faire* principles of the system and the "power diplomacy" which went with it. It claimed great flexibility and responsiveness to the "realities of international life." The power adjustments within the system

created an illusion of dynamic movement and maximum latitude for change of the *status quo* when the established order of things was outstripped by the onward sweep of events. The reality was quite often as not that the system tended to encourage states to cling to an order of things that had passed and to subject change to the test of force.

The search today for collective security as a substitute for these inchoate power relations is based on the idea that not only has man developed beyond the point where he needs to rely on these rough-hewn and rudimentary tools for his protection, but also that the character of the world in which he lives and the means of destruction which he now possesses makes these tools dangerous to his welfare and survival. Increasingly he finds as the world inexorably becomes more rather than less interrelated, that self-preservation and national welfare cannot be disassociated from the security and the welfare of the world as a whole.

Of course historical analysis, like statistics, can be used to attempt to prove any given proposition. Marx, Lenin, and Stalin have used this technique to establish the dogmas of Communism. The Marxian interpretation of history is based on preconceptions which compel a selection of only those factors which substantiate those preconceptions. The ideas of international cooperation can likewise be established by an analysis of history and of social and economic developments in an interdependent world. The presence or absence of preconceptions in the analysis and interpretation which lead to these conclusions must be determined by each individual for himself. It is not the purpose of this paper to enter into these questions. It is evident, however, that the statement made by Trygve Lie, quoted above, will be accepted as valid by most Americans.

The crucial importance of the basic issue posed by these two approaches resides in the power of ideas to move men to action and so to shape the course of history. This ancient truth is particularly to the point today when science has placed at the disposal of man immense resources by which either to imprison the mind through propaganda at the service of a false and destructive idea or to free it from ignorance and bigotry by making the facts available to it. The two above-mentioned interpretations of history and of the nature of the world have produced ideas which are at the root



of the East-West tensions. These embattled ideas are found in the conclusions regarding world peace reached by Soviet Communism and those who believe in collective security through the United Nations. There are fundamental differences between the two philosophies as to the conditions which must prevail in the world before the basic causes of international friction and conflict can be removed and as to the means by which these conditions can be created.

Soviet dialectic concludes that the U.S.S.R. can never be secure so long as powerful capitalist nations exist. Peace will come to the world when control by the proletariat has been established in all or at least the major states. Before this millennium is reached, however, control of the proletariat by a small, tightly organized, and ruthless minority is considered essential in order to assist in the consummation of the inevitable outcome of social forces. The question of when and how transfer of control from this minority to the proletariat is to be accomplished has been neglected. In the meanwhile, a monolithic obedience is exacted. The same approach is applied in international relations. Peace in the world cannot be established before all differences disappear, submerged in a vast subservience to the Soviet image all along the line. In this connection, the Soviets appear to read the present polarization of power between the two centers of Western democracy and Communist Russia as a sharpening of the issues between two irreconcilable civilizations, in which the survival of one requires the death of the other.

The United Nations is based upon a different premise. President Truman in his inaugural address this year stated this premise when he said that "hundreds of millions of people all over the world now agree with us, that we need not have war—that we can have peace." On the occasion of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty he said the same thing in other words when he declared: "We do not consider war inevitable."

This same basic philosophy was stated recently by Benjamin Cohen in the General Assembly, when he said speaking for the United States:

The United States believes in an open world and repudiates the idea that any country or people who are friendly to us must be hostile to any other country. It is strange that those who profess to be opposed to the division of the world into hostile blocs insist upon re-

garding any interest on our part, however legitimate, towards countries friendly to them as hostile and conspiratorial. Those who profess to want a friendly, peaceful world should act in a peaceful, friendly spirit. They should not seek refuge in an artificial and self-imposed isolation which makes them see a plot in every effort to maintain friendly intercourse with them.

In this approach to the problem of peace there is an apparent paradox. The basic principle of the interdependence of the world is accompanied by a companion principle which postulates respect for the independence of the component members of the world community. This latter principle finds its roots in the democratic ideas which regard the state as the servant of the individual and not the reverse, and which consider that differences of opinion, of outlook, and the stress and struggle to reach compromise upon the basis of voluntary agreement within a system of law and order will in the long run insure the best interest of all concerned. This is the same paradox that was resolved in the Constitution of the United States by the principle of peaceful change. Thus, while we recognize the interdependence of the world and consider that this interdependence requires a collective approach to world peace, we do not believe that our security is dependent upon the creation of a world on a United States model through liquidation of all opposition. This philosophy is incorporated in the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, the Soviet concept is like a fish out of water. The non-Communist world does not consider that the existence of other nations with different forms of government and different philosophies of life is necessarily incompatible with its own security and welfare. It seeks the cooperation of these nations in the achievement of the common and enlightened purposes of the United Nations.

The principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty of other nations is a traditional United States policy. This fact is attested by our attitude toward independence of the former colonies of Spain in the Americas in their struggle for emancipation from colonial rule, our Monroe Doctrine, and the Good Neighbor Policy and our practice under it of the principle of nonintervention. All these policies and practices offer evidence of how deeply rooted this principle is in American history. The European Recovery Program, the North Atlantic Treaty and the Military Assistance

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Program, and our policies with respect to the emerging nationalities in the colonial areas of the world are similar reflections of this basic principle.

The principle of respect for and understanding of the differences between peoples is not inconsistent with the companion principle of interdependence. Sovereignty cannot be absolute. A state, in fact, exercises sovereignty when it joins with other states in policies and agrees to mutual limitations upon individual freedom of action in order to accommodate for the good of its own people to the facts of interdependence. The United Nations Charter, which cuts deeply into the older absolute ideas of independence and sovereignty, bears witness to this fact. The United States proposals with respect to atomic energy cut even more deeply into these ideas. These proposals constitute in fact the most revolutionary views in this connection that have been advanced by governments. Sincere and constructive participation in the United Nations and the specialized agencies is based on a recognition of interdependence. It is in such policies as these that we find the real "wave of the future."

Soviet misconceptions regarding the conditions necessary to their security and the policies which they pursue thereunder are unquestionably the chief obstacles to the creation of conditions in the world which will enable the United Nations to operate as it was intended. Soviet doctrinaire ideologies in fact have become the handmaiden of similar policies pursued by Czarist Russia. Lack of confidence of course engenders lack of confidence. It is essential, nevertheless, that this process not be permitted to develop to the point where it will lead to mutual destruction. Ideas are facts and they are also contagious. The Soviet doctrine of the inevitable clash between Communism and Western democracy could easily evoke a similar state of mind in our camp. The task of Western statesmanship is to demonstrate the fallacy of the basic Soviet premise. Unfortunately this objective cannot at the moment be reached by persuasion and example alone. Firmness and strength are more convincing at this stage, as well as a steadfast pressure and vigilance on the part of all the nations who reject the inevitability of war.

It must be borne in mind that the Charter did not attempt to deal directly with the question of great power conflict. It recognized that the great

powers were the only ones that could determine the issue of whether or not there would be another world war. It was thought that they would cooperate for the achievement of the peaceful purposes of the Charter. This assumption is reflected in the principle of unanimity among the great powers, which is now more often known by its negative synonym, the veto. It is also reflected in the provisions of articles 106 and 107 of the Charter, in which it was contemplated that pending the coming into force of the arrangements which would equip the Security Council to take enforcement action, the great powers would take such joint action on behalf of the United Nations as might be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Because of Soviet suspicion and aggression, this transitional period has changed its character from one of cooperation to liquidate the problems of World War II to one of such tension as to create fears that it is a possible prelude to World War III.

We must recognize that we live in a period of transition in great power relations. We see clearly the inadequacies and dangers of older security policies and systems. We seek to replace them by a system of collective security. The latter is in process of being established on a firm and realistic basis. We must still travel a long road of trial and error and of growth and development in the light of experience. As we move forward we must guard against the state of mind in which our desire for peace blinds us to the fact that the job of creating collective security adequate to deal with great power conflict remains to be done and that it calls for a great deal of effort and steadfast purpose. This caveat does not mean, of course, that we must meanwhile continue to play the game according to the old rules. The United Nations has demonstrated its capacity to cope with some of the most difficult problems of this crucial period. It will grow in stature and strength on this diet. We must also create the conditions which will make it increasingly possible for the United Nations to discharge its responsibilities. One of the most important of these conditions is that the nations who sincerely believe in and support the principles of the Charter of the United Nations have the economic and political health which will enable them to exert their full strength on behalf of peace. These are the nations who form the

*(Continued on page 199)*

August 8, 1949

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## THE UNITED NATIONS AND SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

### Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries<sup>1</sup>

*by Assistant Secretary Thorp, U.S. Representative in ECOSOC*

I appreciate the courtesy of being permitted to start the discussion upon the subject of economic development. Of course, the basic fact is that all our countries have a major interest in economic development. It affects the life of each country and its relationship with other countries. In the past, many of those around this table, as well as many of our alumni, have contributed to the development of our understanding of the subject, and the present discussion will likewise be valuable if it brings out the attitudes and points of view of many representatives, in the hope that our collective wisdom may lead to a constructive result.

The basic objective cannot be restated too often. It is to cooperate with the people of economically underdeveloped areas, in their own efforts to develop their human and natural resources, to increase their productive capacity, and to raise their standards of living.

#### **Efforts by ECOSOC and the United States To Meet Objectives**

Since our last meeting, we have made substantial strides forward. We now have before us for consideration the expanded program for technical assistance which we requested of the Secretary-General and the specialized agencies. I know that this accomplishment required great effort on the part of many individuals. At such meetings of the specialized agencies as have been held, the representatives of many countries have participated in vigorous and constructive discussions of the re-

sponsibilities and opportunities of these agencies. The subject has been further explored at the regional commissions. Many individual countries, both those seeking development and those in a position to assist, have clarified their thinking, and some have already expanded their efforts in this field. Many private organizations and individuals have searched their experience and imagination to contribute by analysis, articles, speeches, resolutions, conferences, and direct advice. This is no superficial activity, but stems from a profound realization of the importance of the problem, and the necessity for moving speedily into the sphere of greater and more effective action.

In the United States, during recent months, we have done our best to increase our understanding of the processes and problems of economic development. We have studied carefully our experience in the past with respect to technical assistance and capital investment, both at home and abroad. We have examined, as best we could, the need for technical assistance in other parts of the world and the practical limits which exist upon the operation of specific programs during any one period of time. We have sought out many private individuals and organizations, and others have come to us, to contribute to our body of knowledge. I suppose that well over 500 people in our government have participated in the attempt to evaluate our past experience, and to consider the possibilities of the future.

I wish that I could tell you that this composite effort had uncovered some new and simple solution to the problem. But that has not proved to be the case. What it has done is to sharpen our knowledge and to reinforce and refine most of the gen-

<sup>1</sup> Excerpts from a statement made before the Economic and Social Council in Geneva, on July 21, 1949, and released to the press by the United States delegation to the Economic and Social Council, ninth session, on the same date.



eral propositions which had already been developed in our earlier discussion—the wide variety of needs; the dominant part played by the recipient country; the necessity of thinking of development in terms of long periods of time; the importance of coordination of programs; the limiting factor of qualified personnel, both foreign and local; the limiting factor of capital and management, both foreign and local; the limiting factor of social habits and institutions inherited from the past; the tremendous organizational and administrative difficulties of setting up and maintaining programs of so many types in so many areas; and the impossibility of formulating exact and complete programs far in advance. In fact, while we can have a clearly defined and constant objective, the achievement of this objective will require continual evolution in the nature of assistance given and the methods of approach.

#### Proposed Legislation Sent to United States Congress

It may sound as though the record were one primarily indicating difficulties and obstacles. The fact is that it also includes illustration after illustration of extraordinary accomplishment. In every field, health, education, agriculture, and all the rest, particular projects have demonstrated that, with appropriate support from the local authorities, a small number of experts can bring tremendous benefits to large numbers of people. On the basis of this preparatory work which provides a strong, factual basis describing the importance and possibilities of economic development, President Truman submitted proposed legislation to Congress on June 24, 1949. I should like to repeat certain excerpts from his message:

In order to enable the United States, in cooperation with other countries, to assist the peoples of economically underdeveloped areas to raise their standards of living, I recommend the enactment of legislation to authorize an expanded program of technical assistance for such areas, and an experimental program for encouraging the outflow of private investment beneficial to their economic development. These measures are the essential first steps in an undertaking which will call upon private enterprise and voluntary organizations in the United States, as well as the Government, to take part in a constantly growing effort to improve economic conditions in the less developed regions of the world.

The grinding poverty and the lack of economic opportunity for many millions of people in the economically underdeveloped parts of Africa, the Near and Far East, and certain regions of Central and South America, constitute one of the greatest challenges of the world today.

... assistance in the development of the economically underdeveloped areas has become one of the major elements of our foreign policy. In my inaugural address, I outlined a program to help the peoples of these areas to attain greater production as a way to prosperity and peace.

The major effort in such a program must be local in character; it must be made by the people of the underdeveloped areas themselves. It is essential, however, to the success of their effort that there be help from abroad. In some cases, the peoples of these areas will be unable to begin their part of this great enterprise without initial aid from other countries.

The aid that is needed falls roughly into two categories. The first is the technical, scientific and managerial knowledge necessary to economic development. This category includes not only medical and educational knowledge, and assistance and advice in such basic fields as sanitation, communications, road building and governmental services, but also, and perhaps most important, assistance in the survey of resources and in planning for long-range economic development.

The second category is production goods—machinery and equipment—and financial assistance in the creation of productive enterprises. The underdeveloped areas need capital for port and harbor development, roads and communications, irrigation and drainage projects, as well as for public utilities and the whole range of extractive, processing and manufacturing industries.

Much of the capital required can be provided by these areas themselves, in spite of their low standards of living. But much must come from abroad.

The two categories of aid are closely related. Technical assistance is necessary to lay the groundwork for productive investment. Investment, in turn, brings with it technical assistance. In general, however, technical surveys of resources and of the possibilities of economic development must precede substantial capital investment. Furthermore, in many of the areas concerned, technical assistance in improving sanitation, communications or education is required to create conditions in which capital investment can be fruitful.

Much of the aid that is needed can be provided most effectively through the United Nations.

The enactment of these two legislative proposals, the first pertaining to technical assistance and the second to the encouragement of foreign investment, will constitute a national endorsement of a program of major importance in our efforts for world peace and economic stability. Nevertheless, these measures are only the first steps. We are here embarking on a venture that extends far into the future. We are at the beginning of a rising curve of activity, private, governmental and international, that will continue for many years to come. It is all the more important, therefore, that we start promptly.

In addition to the special legislation mentioned in the message, other matters have been laid before the Congress bearing on the problem before us, the most important being a proposal to lift the existing ceilings established by legislation for the American contribution to the regular budgets of certain specialized agencies.

It is less than 4 weeks since the President's message with its specific proposals was sent to the Congress, and it will be considered as soon as the legislative timetable permits. In the meantime, I am happy to report that the program appears to have strong popular backing in the United States. The press and many national organizations have recognized its importance and have expressed their interest and strong support.

#### Opportunity for Leadership

It is, of course, not necessary for any country to receive the signal from the United Nations or from

the specialized agencies to move ahead in the field of economic development. Nor are we a necessary party to international cooperation in this field. Many multilateral and bilateral projects are in existence. Many of the underdeveloped countries have already begun practical planning, and other countries have indicated in one way or another that they are looking forward to participating both in making technical assistance available and in developing a greater flow of capital. Clearly, the world seems ready for a major international cooperative effort, and the opportunity for leadership is ours in the Council.

I do not propose to take the time of the Council in discussing general principles. The facts of underdevelopment are clear. The need for action is clear. The duty of the United Nations and the specialized agencies is clear. We have had plenty of discussion about the problem in the past. At this session we should discuss action. If there are obstacles, we must find ways of breaking through them. If there are jurisdictional problems, we must see that they do not block progress. We have a job to do, and we must figure out how to get it moving promptly and effectively.

#### Action Required by ECOSOC

This brings us to the question: What action is required at this session of the Economic and Social Council?

At our last session at Lake Success this Council adopted a resolution requesting the Secretary-General, in consultation with the specialized agencies, to prepare a special report proposing an expanded program of technical assistance for economic development. This report was to contain three types of information. First, it was to present a comprehensive plan for the expanded program. Second, it was to suggest methods of financing such a program. Third, it was to recommend ways of coordinating the planning and execution of the program.

The Secretary-General's report was published at the end of May. It is a book of some 300 pages. It lists a great variety of proposals, estimated to cost a total of \$35,800,000 the first year. I wish to express our appreciation of the research, preparatory planning, and imagination which this report represents, and particularly the careful statement of objectives in the opening pages of the report.

I shall comment in their order on the three elements of the Secretary-General's report.

#### A Comprehensive Plan for the Expanded Program

First, the comprehensive plan. The Secretary-General stated in his report that he was in fact presenting not one program but six separate sets of

proposals prepared by six different secretariats. The Administrative Committee on Coordination did not find it possible to comment on these proposals. It did not examine them for duplications. It did not suggest omissions. It did not determine whether all these projects would bear directly to economic development. It did not determine whether all these proposals could practically be undertaken in the first year. I think it is a fair statement that this report contains a list of potential projects, but is not a finished program. In defense of the report, I should say that no guidance was given to its authors with respect to any limits within which they should work.

However, there are such limits. The United States believes that an effective and efficient program totaling nearly 36 million dollars could not in fact be carried out by the United Nations and the specialized agencies during the first year. Many delays will be found in expanding the supervisory staff of these agencies, in negotiating agreements with governments, in recruiting the necessary experts, and in organizing the necessary training facilities. The shortage of available technicians and training facilities at the beginning of the program would alone require a substantial reduction in the proposals of the participating agencies for the first year.

It is far easier to send to a foreign country a boatload of wheat than a boatload of technical assistance. Technical assistance must travel in the form of books or people or demonstration equipment. Procedurally, it is easier to obtain good wheat than able people. There are fewer problems in making all the necessary arrangements for a country to import a shipload of wheat than to prepare for a group of foreign advisers. It takes a larger administrative staff to look after a million dollars worth of experts, measured of course in budget terms, than an equal value of foodstuffs.

My comments are not intended to cast doubt on technical assistance, but rather to urge a careful beginning. I believe this Council should decide what is the range of possibilities for the size of next year's program. Such possibilities are controlled first, by the shortage of technicians and other limiting factors in the operation of technical assistance; and second, by the amounts of money which the member nations are prepared to contribute. I believe we have some notion of the range of possibilities. For myself, I would suggest a range from 15 million to 25 million dollars. The United States believes that the United Nations and the specialized agencies could spend effectively no more than 25 million dollars in the first year. We feel confident that a minimum of 15 million dollars would be available from the member governments for financing the program. This gives us a range of possibilities.

The figures I am using are comparable to the 36 million dollars proposed in the Secretary-General's report. I believe it would indeed be a great



achievement if we could spend wisely an amount of money ranging from 15 million to 25 million dollars. Even the lowest figure would represent an extraordinary increase to be accomplished in a single year.

Within this range, the United States suggests that this Council should determine the basic elements in a balanced program, for recommendation to the General Assembly for consideration by a larger audience. The Council should judge the programs put forward in the report on the basis of their contribution to effective economic development. It should determine a 15-million-dollar program, for example, how much it is prepared to recommend for agriculture, how much for health, how much for education. This same process should be repeated for a 20-million-dollar program and a 25-million-dollar program.

Thus this Council would have obtained from the specialized agencies their best judgment on the technical details of a program, but would have applied its own judgment as to the best use of such resources in a balanced program for economic development, whatever the amount available in the ultimate budget.

The United States believes that such a critical review of the Secretary-General's report and the determination of priorities within the range of possibilities—say, between 15 million and 25 million dollars—should be undertaken by a committee on our behalf before this range of programs is discussed in plenary session. The report is too long, and the subject too technical for effective discussion without such preparation work by a committee.

I therefore suggest that the Council create a committee on technical assistance which will sit during this session of the Council and will report back to the Council prior to its adjournment.

The membership of this committee will require special consideration. The persons who sit on this committee should be competent to discuss the details of an economic development program. The members should be available to sit full time for the next 2 weeks or more. And the members should be drawn from both advanced industrial countries and those which are considered underdeveloped.

Of course, it is expected that representatives of the specialized agencies will meet with the committee, and their technical judgments will be most valuable in the formulation of priorities. I cannot overemphasize that my proposal calls for joint action between this Council and the specialized agencies.

This committee, in the course of its discussion, would examine the proposals presented by each participating agency. They would have to be judged on the basis of their contribution to eco-

nomic development. It would consider what proposals, in its judgment, could not be carried out effectively on the scale proposed in the first year. The final products of the committee's work would be three programs, according to the three levels of possible operation.

We would thus have a concrete set of program alternatives, which could be used later this year as a basis for negotiating the funds for this program. The actual size of the program would thus be determined after the General Assembly had considered our report. But the nature of the program, its priorities and emphasis, would be clearly formulated at this meeting.

The review which the suggested committee would make, in close consultation with the specialized agencies, would indeed place the Council in a position to express a sound judgment on the scope and content of the intended program. On the basis of the considerations by such a committee, the Council would be able to propose to the General Assembly a well-considered, useful, and balanced program, while avoiding the difficult fact that we here cannot possibly know what the total level of operation can be. At the same time, the Council would be in a position to advise the specialized agencies concerning the aspects of their proposed programs which would contribute most directly to orderly economic development.

The United States recognizes, as I am sure we all do, that the specialized agencies are more competent, each in its own technical field, than is this over-all body in the technical field of any one of the agencies. Therefore, the final determination as to the exact projects to be carried out by each agency, within the limits of the funds made available to it, must be made by the agency itself. It is expected, of course, that the agencies will take their decisions in the full light of the Council's recommendations. Only in such way can there be assurance of a balanced program among the agencies which will be technically sound in all aspects and pointed at all times at the single objective of economic development. By thus combining the broader economic judgment of this Council with the technical competence of the specialized agencies, a sound total program can be developed and activated.

So far I have spoken only about a first-year program in 1950. The programs put forward by the specialized agencies wisely look forward to the first 2 years. If governments are to have the program for the second year in adequate time for consideration when their legislative bodies are considering appropriation bills, it will be necessary for us to take up the 1951 budgets at our next session in February 1950. I hope that the Administrative Committee on Coordination will review the proposals for the second-year program between now and our next session, and will present their results in terms of alternative levels of expenditure.



**Establishing and Collecting Contributions**

The second problem relates to the method of establishing and collecting contributions for this program.

The Secretary-General's report presents the consensus among the participating agencies that each agency would approach its membership separately, asking for sufficient funds in a supplemental budget to undertake their technical assistance activities. This recommendation is contained in part 3 chapter 5, of the Secretary-General's report.

There are several different possible methods of financing the programs. They are closely related to the manner in which the programs are themselves determined. If there were to be some single agency, either the United Nations or a new agency, which was to make program decisions from time to time and allocate funds to the appropriate agencies, then a single fund would presumably be established. If, at the other extreme, the specialized agencies were to have complete responsibility in determining their programs, other than mutual consultation, completely separate budgets would be the proper form of financing.

The method of developing the programs which I have suggested provides for a determination of allocations of various levels of contributions through review by Ecosoc of the proposals of the participating agencies, and subsequent approval by the General Assembly. This method of developing the programs postpones the determination of what can be expected on the contributions side and therefore what size of program is appropriate, presumably until the time of the General Assembly. If the Ecosoc should adopt the programming procedure which I have suggested, then the appropriate procedure for financing would need to be somewhat different from that suggested in the Secretary-General's report.

While I do not believe that it is appropriate to discuss this point in detail until after we have decided on the question of how to deal with the program problem, it may be helpful if I sketch briefly some thoughts on the subject. It has seemed to us that negotiation and commitment of contributions might best be accomplished at a general technical assistance conference sponsored by the United Nations and called by Ecosoc under the General Assembly supplementary rule. The conference might be held during or directly after the General Assembly session, once the report on technical assistance had been adopted. All governments belonging to any agency participating in the program would be invited.

The essential element is to have present at the same time and place representatives of all interested governments to negotiate and commit funds. The conference would take as the basis for its

action the reports of Ecosoc and the General Assembly, both as to total over-all program and the proposed proportionate share of each agency. The final act of the conference would record the global amount of all contributions, the total amount of contributions of each agency, the total amount of contribution agreed to be contributed by each participating government, and the undertaking of the participating governments to pay their contributions to the agency to which pledged.

In considering the problem of financial procedure, there are certain considerations which must be kept in mind.

First, the procedure should be the one which would yield the most funds. Second, it must tend to enforce the basic decisions as to the allocations among the several agencies. Third, it must provide a suitable working relationship between the United Nations and the specialized agencies.

**Methods of Coordination for the Program**

I believe this subject of the appropriate method for determining contributions can best be discussed by this Council, and does not require any preliminary committee work.

I now turn to a third topic in the Secretary-General's report, namely, the method of coordination for this program.

The report recommends that coordination among the various specialized agencies and the United Nations in carrying out the program would be provided by a Technical Assistance Committee, working under the Administrative Committee on Coordination. The TAC, like the present ACC, would be made up of representatives of the various participating agencies. The proposed Technical Assistance Committee has the support of my government.

The United States believes that this committee will be particularly useful in assuring the prompt exchange of information among the United Nations agencies, as well as among individual governments engaged in similar programs. It also affords a continuing point of consultation among the participating agencies.

But the United States is uncertain whether a committee composed only of representatives of participating agencies should be the only group to examine and screen the program before it is presented to this Council. I am not prepared to make any suggestions at this time for a permanent arrangement. But I suspect that the kind of working committee which I am recommending in this Council to review the first-year program will also be helpful in future years.

There is one area of necessary coordination not mentioned in the report, namely, that with other intergovernmental organizations such as the Organization of American States. Already, close working relationships have developed in some fields, notably, between the Pan-American Sani-

ary Bureau and the World Health Organization. Any definitive plan must provide for this type of coordination as well as those discussed in the report.

#### Technical Assistance Measures Taken or Approved

In addition to the major report which I have been discussing, we also have before us three reports from the Secretary-General on measures already taken or proposed by the United Nations and the specialized agencies to give technical assistance for economic development within the framework of their ordinary budgets and activities. I shall reserve detailed comment on these reports until a later time. Two of these reports (E/1335 and E/1345) deal with the record of technical assistance projects prior to 1950 and should, in my opinion, be included in the Council's report to the General Assembly which we are required to make under the Assembly's Resolution 198 (III). In the view of the United States, these regular activities in the field of technical assistance should continue to be provided for in the regular budgets of the United Nations and the specialized agencies, regardless of the outcome of the additional programs which we are chiefly considering here. As to the third document (E/1335/Add.1) reporting action of the Secretary-General in proposing an increase to 676 thousand dollars in the provision for technical assistance under General Assembly Resolution 200 (III), I will limit myself at this stage to saying that the United States approves the increased amount and to suggesting that the document should be referred to the committee which I have proposed for reviewing the other technical assistance programs.

In its discussions on economic development, the Council has always considered the two major aspects of this subject: technical assistance and capital investment. We have before us a comprehensive report of the Secretary-General on the function, importance, and origins of capital for financing economic development, as well as the reports on technical assistance which I have already discussed. As the quotation from President Truman's message of June 24 made clear, our work in the United States has also taken into full account both aspects of our problem.

#### Technical Cooperation and Capital Investment Processes

The adoption of improved techniques alone can in many situations lead directly to increased well-being. Full achievement of our economic development objectives, however, is closely tied to the mobilization and utilization of new capital.

Expert road builders capable of using the most modern methods are wasted without the essential heavy equipment. A collection of skilled industrial workers is ineffective unless capital moves in to put tools in their hands.

Fundamentally, there is only one source of such new capital. It is the part of the world's current output which is not consumed immediately, but is utilized to make possible greater production and consumption in the future. There must be some inducement for people to save rather than consume their product. There must be conditions to prompt the movement of these savings into productive investment rather than into unproductive hoards.

However, capital flows through many intermediaries. It may be mobilized through private or public institutions, both in capital-importing and capital-exporting countries. It may come through international institutions such as the International Bank. There has been too great a tendency to consider these various channels as mutually exclusive. Rather, they are in considerable measure complementary means of financing development and each should be used fully in those activities to which it is best suited.

We must accept as a principle that, over time, local capital must play a dominant role in the development of underdeveloped areas. Tentative estimates presented by the Food and Agriculture Organization and included in the Secretary-General's report to this conference—data prepared largely by the underdeveloped countries themselves—indicate that 80 percent of their immediate development financing needs would come from the underdeveloped countries themselves. It is our belief that this over-all percentage is certainly not a high estimate. However, there are limits to the extent to which investment, whether private or public, can come from local resources in any particular underdeveloped country: the margin for savings is small, and the inflationary dangers great. These difficulties and dangers must be balanced against the disadvantages of incurring debts which must be serviced in foreign currencies.

It has frequently been argued that there is a dearth of foreign investment funds. Few would deny that a larger flow of international finance would have been advantageous during the recent past. But I wonder whether this has been due more to an inherently short supply of investment funds than to the fact that there have not been adequate inducements to attract foreign capital into effective uses in underdeveloped areas. Thus, there are large, lendable resources in the International Bank. And these resources can be expanded. While we can all agree that the International Bank has moved slowly in its approach to development financing, and while we all welcome recent evidence of an accelerated rate of lending, I think there is truth in the Bank's claim



that this record is partly the result of a shortage of projects thought through to the point where they are ready for foreign financing. Similarly, the Export-Import Bank in the United States has resources sufficient to meet a greater demand than is currently before it.

Most important, there is reason to believe that, at least in the United States, large quantities of investment funds are potentially available from private sources, particularly in the form of direct investment. As citizens of a democratic free-enterprise economy, we in the United States are particularly convinced of the special contribution which private investment can make to development in underdeveloped countries. Such an investment brings with it not only capital goods but techniques, organizational and managerial experience which assure their most effective use. Moreover, the volume in which it could be available far exceeds that which could be anticipated from governmental sources. In 1948, well over 40 billion dollars was newly invested by private United States sources at home and abroad. The vast bulk has, of course, gone into domestic investment, but the total gives some measure of the large pool of private investment from which funds could be attracted to contribute to development abroad—if conditions existed for inducing this flow.

In calling to your attention these large sources of private investment funds, I am well aware of the frequent charges that have been made about the iniquities perpetrated through private investment abroad. While I believe that the record, accurately evaluated, shows that these iniquities have been exaggerated, I reiterate the clear intention of my government that the private investment abroad which it favors will not be susceptible to the charge of imperialism. The United States expects private investors to give due regard to the welfare of persons dependent on their enterprises, to contribute their fair share of taxes to the local community, to conserve as well as to develop local resources, and to conduct their enterprises so that the investment will be of mutual benefit to both the investor and to the recipient countries. It is not our intent to seek special, discriminatory treatment for our investors in foreign countries.

The United States for its part will continue to promote foreign investment for economic development by supporting the activities of the International Bank and the Export-Import Bank in fields appropriate to public financing. It will continue to seek to improve the climate for private foreign investment by negotiating mutual assurances of fair and equitable treatment with countries desiring to admit foreign capital. It will continue actively to negotiate conventions to relieve investors of the burden of double taxation. In addition, proposed legislation, which will permit us to guarantee United States private capital

newly invested in productive enterprises abroad against some of the risks peculiar to such investments, may well remove some of the deterrents to international private capital flow. The United States Government is also studying possible changes in United States tax laws, which may further encourage the flow of such capital abroad.

It is against this background that I express optimism about the availability of foreign capital for investment abroad. It seems that there is now little need for debate on the advantages and disadvantages of one or another method of securing such capital. There is rather need for specific action to increase the effective demand, to provide the conditions which will move more of this capital into underdeveloped areas. Much of this action must be taken by the underdeveloped countries, and the technical cooperation program will facilitate such action. It will help create an environment conducive to increased private capital flow. It will facilitate the preparation and presentation of projects for foreign public financing or for intergovernmental financing.

It is always important to appreciate that the technical cooperation and capital investment processes which I have been discussing are cumulative. As the program develops in the future, additional qualified technical personnel will become available, additional experience will be gained, and methods of disseminating information will be improved so that the technical cooperation aspects of the program may be expanded. The investment aspects of the program will in most cases develop progressively after technical assistance has made the necessary surveys, trained the necessary personnel, and in general prepared the way for developments requiring capital investment. As other existing obstacles are eliminated, investment can rise substantially to meet the needs and take advantage of the opportunities. The principle of compound interest, namely, that capital increases productivity so that more capital can be created, will inevitably increase the supply of investment funds in the future, if an effective demand is present.

In the long run, the program also should lead to the result that more and more countries will be in a position to contribute to the total effort, both in technical assistance and capital investment. This will be particularly true as the initial impetus and capacity in various fields is transferred from foreign technicians to nearly trained local experts, and as local communities develop ways and means of forming and usefully employing capital. No country has a monopoly on either of these essentials, and the cooperative effort can accomplish far more than separate individual efforts.

However, our problem today is not the long-range future, but the program for the first year. I hope that my suggestion of a special committee to work on the problem of programs will commend itself to the other members of the Council, and that it can get to work as quickly as possible.

Department of State Bulletin



## Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement

Contained in U. N. doc. S/1353, as corrected  
Transmitted July 20, 1949

### Preamble

The Parties to the present Agreement,

RESPONDING to the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948, calling upon them, as a further provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations and in order to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, to negotiate an armistice;

HAVING DECIDED to enter into negotiations under United Nations Chairmanship concerning the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948; and having appointed representatives empowered to negotiate and conclude an Armistice Agreement;

The undersigned representatives, having exchanged their full powers found to be in good and proper form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

### Article I

With a view to promoting the return of permanent peace in Palestine and in recognition of the importance in this regard of mutual assurances concerning the future military operations of the Parties, the following principles, which shall be fully observed by both Parties during the armistice, are hereby affirmed:

1. The injunction of the Security Council against resort to military force in the settlement of the Palestine question shall henceforth be scrupulously respected by both Parties. The establishment of an armistice between their armed forces is accepted as an indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace in Palestine.

2. No aggressive action by the armed forces—land, sea or air—of either Party shall be undertaken, planned, or threatened against the people or the armed forces of the other; it being understood that the use of the term "planned" in this context has no bearing on normal staff planning as generally practised in military organizations.

3. The right of each Party to its security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other shall be fully respected.

### Article II

With a specific view to the implementation of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948, the following principles and purposes are affirmed:

1. The principle that no military or political advantage

should be gained under the truce ordered by the Security Council is recognized.

2. It is also recognized that no provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either Party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question, the provisions of this Agreement being dictated exclusively by military and not by political considerations.

### Article III

1. In pursuance of the foregoing principles and of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948, a general armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties—land, sea and air—is hereby established.

2. No element of the land, sea or air military or paramilitary forces of either Party, including non-regular forces, shall commit any warlike or hostile act against the military or para-military forces of the other Party, or against civilians in territory under the control of that Party; or shall advance beyond or pass over for any purpose whatsoever the Armistice Demarcation Line set forth in Article V of this Agreement; or enter into or pass through the air space of the other Party or through the waters within three miles of the coastline of the other Party.

3. No warlike act or act of hostility shall be conducted from territory controlled by one of the Parties to this Agreement against the other Party or against civilians in territory under control of that Party.

### Article IV

1. The line described in Article V of this Agreement shall be designated as the Armistice Demarcation Line and is delineated in pursuance of the purpose and intent of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948.

2. The basic purpose of the Armistice Demarcation Line is to delineate the line beyond which the armed forces of the respective Parties shall not move.

3. Rules and regulations of the armed forces of the Parties, which prohibit civilians from crossing the fighting lines or entering the area between the lines, shall remain in effect after the signing of this Agreement with application to the Armistice Demarcation Line defined in Article V, subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of that Article.

### Article V

1. It is emphasized that the following arrangements for the Armistice Demarcation Line between the Israeli and

August 8, 1949

847266—49—3

177

Syrian armed forces and for the Demilitarized Zone are not to be interpreted as having any relation whatsoever to ultimate territorial arrangements affecting the two Parties to this Agreement.

2. In pursuance of the spirit of the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948, the Armistice Demarcation Line and the Demilitarized Zone have been defined with a view toward separating the armed forces of the two Parties in such manner as to minimize the possibility of friction and incident, while providing for the gradual restoration of normal civilian life in the area of the Demilitarized Zone, without prejudice to the ultimate settlement.

3. The Armistice Demarcation Line shall be as delineated on the map attached to this Agreement as Annex I. The Armistice Demarcation Line shall follow a line midway between the existing truce lines, as certified by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for the Israeli and Syrian forces. Where the existing truce lines run along the international boundary between Syria and Palestine, the Armistice Demarcation Line shall follow the boundary line.

4. The armed forces of the two Parties shall nowhere advance beyond the Armistice Demarcation Line.

5. (a) Where the Armistice Demarcation Line does not correspond to the international boundary between Syria and Palestine, the area between the Armistice Demarcation Line and the boundary, pending final territorial settlement between the Parties, shall be established as a Demilitarized Zone from which the armed forces of both Parties shall be totally excluded, and in which no activities by military or para-military forces shall be permitted. This provision applies to the Ein Gev and Dardara sectors which shall form part of the Demilitarized Zone.

(b) Any advance by the armed forces, military or para-military, of either Party into any part of the Demilitarized Zone, when confirmed by the United Nations representatives referred to in the following sub-paragraph, shall constitute a flagrant violation of this Agreement.

(c) The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission established in Article VII of this Agreement and United Nations Observers attached to the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring the full implementation of this Article.

(d) The withdrawal of such armed forces as are now found in the Demilitarized Zone shall be in accordance with the schedule of withdrawal annexed to this Agreement (Annex II).

(e) The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be empowered to authorize the return of civilians to villages and settlements in the Demilitarized Zone and the employment of limited numbers of locally recruited civilian police in the zone for internal security purposes, and shall be guided in this regard by the schedule of withdrawal referred to in sub-paragraph (d) of this Article.

6. On each side of the Demilitarized Zone there shall be areas, as defined in Annex III to this Agreement, in which defensive forces only shall be maintained, in accordance

with the definition of defensive forces set forth in Annex IV to this agreement.

#### Article VI

All prisoners of war detained by either Party to this Agreement and belonging to the armed forces, regular or irregular, of the other Party, shall be exchanged as follows:

1. The exchange of prisoners of war shall be under United Nations supervision and control throughout. The exchange shall take place at the site of the Armistice Conference within twenty-four hours of the signing of this Agreement.

2. Prisoners of war against whom a penal prosecution may be pending, as well as those sentenced for crime or other offence, shall be included in this exchange of prisoners.

3. All articles of personal use, valuables, letters, documents, identification marks, and other personal effects of whatever nature, belonging to prisoners of war who are being exchanged, shall be returned to them, or, if they have escaped or died, to the Party to whose armed forces they belonged.

4. All matters not specifically regulated in this Agreement shall be decided in accordance with the principles laid down in the International Convention relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed at Geneva on 27 July 1929.

5. The Mixed Armistice Commission established in Article VII of this Agreement shall assume responsibility for locating missing persons, whether military or civilian, within the areas controlled by each Party, to facilitate their expeditious exchange. Each Party undertakes to extend to the Commission full co-operation and assistance in the discharge of this function.

#### Article VII

1. The execution of the provisions of this Agreement shall be supervised by a Mixed Armistice Commission composed of five members, of whom each Party to this Agreement shall designate two, and whose Chairman shall be the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization or a senior officer from the Observer personnel of that Organization designated by him following consultation with both Parties to this Agreement.

2. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall maintain its headquarters at the Customs House near Jisr Banat Yakub and at Mahanayim, and shall hold its meetings at such places and at such times as it may deem necessary for the effective conduct of its work.

3. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall be convened in its first meeting by the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization not later than one week following the signing of this Agreement.

4. Decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission, to the extent possible, shall be based on the principle of unanimity. In the absence of unanimity, decisions shall be taken by majority vote of the members of the Commission present and voting.

5. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall formulate its own rules of procedure. Meetings shall be held only

after due notice to the members by the Chairman. The quorum for its meetings shall be a majority of its members.

6. The Commission shall be empowered to employ observers, who may be from among the military organizations of the Parties or from the military personnel of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, or from both, in such numbers as may be considered essential to the performance of its functions. In the event United Nations Observers should be so employed, they shall remain under the command of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. Assignments of a general or special nature given to United Nations Observers attached to the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be subject to approval by the United Nations Chief of Staff or his designated representative on the Commission, whichever is serving as Chairman.

7. Claims or complaints presented by either Party relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred immediately to the Mixed Armistice Commission through its Chairman. The Commission shall take such action on all such claims or complaints by means of its observation and investigation machinery as it may deem appropriate, with a view to equitable and mutually satisfactory settlement.

8. Where interpretation of the meaning of a particular provision of this Agreement, other than the Preamble and Article I and II, is at issue, the Commission's interpretation shall prevail. The Commission, in its discretion and as the need arises, may from time to time recommend to the Parties modifications in the provisions of this Agreement.

9. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall submit to both Parties reports on its activities as frequently as it may consider necessary. A copy of each such report shall be presented to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the appropriate organ or agency of the United Nations.

10. Members of the Commission and its Observers shall be accorded such freedom of movement and access in the area covered by this Agreement as the Commission may determine to be necessary, provided that when such decisions of the Commission are reached by a majority vote United Nations Observers only shall be employed.

11. The expenses of the Commission, other than those relating to United Nations Observers, shall be apportioned in equal shares between the two Parties to this Agreement.

#### Article VIII

1. The present Agreement is not subject to ratification and shall come into force immediately upon being signed.

2. This Agreement, having been negotiated and concluded in pursuance of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948 calling for the establishment of an armistice in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, shall remain in force until a peaceful settlement between the Parties is achieved, except as provided in paragraph 3 of this Article.

August 8, 1949

3. The Parties to this Agreement may, by mutual consent, revise this Agreement or any of its provisions, or may suspend its application, other than Articles I and III, at any time. In the absence of mutual agreement and after this Agreement has been in effect for one year from the date of its signing, either of the Parties may call upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convoke a conference of representatives of the two Parties for the purpose of reviewing, revising, or suspending any of the provisions of this Agreement other than Articles I and III. Participation in such conferences shall be obligatory upon the Parties.

4. If the conference provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article does not result in an agreed solution of a point in dispute, either Party may bring the matter before the Security Council of the United Nations for the relief sought on the grounds that this Agreement has been concluded in pursuance of Security Council action toward the end of achieving peace in Palestine.

5. This Agreement, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, is signed in quintuplicate. One copy shall be retained by each Party, two copies communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the Security Council and the United Nations Conciliation Commission on Palestine, and one copy to the Acting Mediator on Palestine.

DONE at Hill 232 near MAHANAYIM on the 20th July 1949, in the presence of the Personal Deputy of the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine and the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization.

For and on Behalf of the  
Israeli Government

Signed: LT. COL. MORDECHAI MAKLEFF  
YENOSHUA PENMAN  
SHABTAI ROSENN

For and on Behalf of the  
Syrian Government

Signed: COL. FOZI SELO  
LT. COL.  
MOHAMED NASSER  
CAPT. AFIF SIZRI

#### ANNEXES

U. N. doc. S/1353/Add. 1  
Transmitted July 20, 1949

#### Annex I

Map together with detailed description of the Armistice Demarcation Line.<sup>1</sup>

#### Annex II

*Withdrawal of Military and Para-Military Forces; Removal of Mines and Destruction of Permanent Fortifications*

<sup>1</sup> Not here printed. See U.N. doc. S/1353/Add. 2, July 27, 1949.



1. The withdrawal of military and para-military forces of both parties with all of their military impediments from the demilitarized zone, as defined by Article 5 of this Agreement, shall be complete within a period of twelve (12) weeks from the date of the signing of this Agreement.

2. Schedule of withdrawal of forces will be as follows:

(a) First three (3) weeks, the military forces occupying the sector from the Syrian-Palestinian border at the north-south to Ad Darbishiya (MR 211-277)

(b) Second three (3) weeks, the military forces occupying the sector from El Hammam (MR 208.7-262.3) south to the Trans-Jordan frontier.

(c) Remaining six (6) weeks, the military forces occupying the sector from Ad Darbishiya (MR 211-277) south to El Hammam (MR 208.7-262.3).

3. Removal of minefields and mines, and the destruction or removal of permanent fortifications in the demilitarized zone shall be completed in each sector by the end of the third, sixth, and twelfth week respectively from the date of the signing of this Agreement.

4. In this connexion, each Party is entitled to remove from the demilitarized zone its war material. In case it does not choose to remove material used in fortifications, the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission may require either side to destroy such material before leaving the area. The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission may similarly order the destruction of such permanent fortifications which, in his view, ought not to remain in the demilitarized zone.

### Annex III

#### Defensive Area

No military forces other than those defined in Annex IV will be authorized to remain or enter the area defined below:

(a) On the Syrian side, the area from the boundary to the north-south co-ordinate line 216.

(b) On the Israeli side, the area from the Israeli truce line to the north-south co-ordinate line 204, except that where the truce line is established in the Nishmer Hay Yarden salient, the defensive area shall be at a distance of six (6) kilometres west from this truce line.

(c) Villages which are crossed by the lines defining the defensive area shall be entirely included in the defensive area.

### Annex IV

#### Definition of Defensive Forces

##### I. Land Forces

1. These forces not to exceed:

(a) Three (3) Infantry Battalions, each Battalion to consist of not more than 600 officers and enlisted men, its accompanying weapons not to exceed twelve (12) medium machine-guns (M. M. G's) of a caliber not to exceed 8 mm., six (6) 81 mm. mortars, four (4) anti tank guns not to exceed 75 mm.

(b) Six (6) Cavalry Squadrons for Syrian forces, each squadron not to exceed 130 officers and enlisted men; and for Israeli, two (2) Reconnaissance Squadrons, each squadron composed of nine (9) jeeps, and three (3) half-tracks (not armoured), its personnel not to exceed one hundred twenty-five (125) officers and enlisted men.

(c) Three (3) Field Artillery Batteries, each Battery not to exceed 110 officers and enlisted men. Each battery to consist of four (4) guns of a caliber not to exceed 75 mm. and four (4) machine guns (M. M. G's) not to exceed 8 mm.

(d) Service units to the above forces not to exceed:

(1) One hundred (100) officers and enlisted men for supply purposes, not armed.

(11) One (1) engineer company not to exceed two hundred and fifty (250) officers and enlisted men.

2. The following are excluded from the term "Defensive Forces": armour, such as tanks, armoured cars, or any other armoured force carriers.

##### II. Air Forces

In the areas where Defensive Forces only shall be allowed, the use of military aircraft shall be prohibited.

##### III. Naval Forces

No naval force shall be allowed in the Defensive Area.

IV. In the areas in which Defensive Forces only have to be maintained, the necessary reduction of forces shall be completed within twelve (12) weeks from the date on which this Agreement is signed.

V. No traffic restriction is imposed on the transport used for the carrying of defensive troops and supplies within the area of defensive forces.

## Israeli-Syrian Armistice Evidence That Conciliation Can Be Achieved

### Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press July 20]

The signing of the Israeli-Syrian armistice on July 20 is a further evidence that contending parties can find ways of reaching agreement on a difficult problem. Both governments are to be congratulated on the results of their efforts. This is a goal which the United Nations has been seeking; namely, a step toward peace in this area. Great credit is due the representatives of the United Nations in this achievement—Acting Mediator Ralph Bunche and his able assistants, Brig. Gen. William Riley, USMC, and Henri Vigier of France.

It is my hope that this development will increase the possibility for the achievement of a final settlement at Lausanne.

## The United States in the United Nations

[July 30–August 5]

### Cessation of Hostilities in Indonesia

Meeting under the auspices of the Commission for Indonesia, delegations of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia and representatives from the Federal Consultative Assembly on August 1 formalized the results of recent discussions concerning the cessation of hostilities throughout Indonesia. The cease-hostilities orders are to be issued simultaneously by the Netherlands and Republic Governments to their respective armed forces. At the same time joint proclamation is to be promulgated by both governments calling on everyone concerned to banish all thought of enmity or revenge, to refrain from sabotage and terrorism and from all acts which might be harmful to mutual cooperation, and to avoid provocations and incidents of any kind.

### Security Council Considers Palestine Report

The Security Council on August 4 began consideration of the report of the acting mediator for Palestine, Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, on the present status of the armistice negotiations and the truce in Palestine. A resolution proposed by Dr. Bunche, declaring that the completion of armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab states rendered unnecessary the prolongation of the truce and terminating or transferring the functions of the mediator, was generally supported by the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Egypt, China, and Cuba.

The Israeli representative urged the Security Council to maintain its arms embargo, with the warning that if the restraints imposed by the Security Council were entirely lifted and large-scale rearmament became the policy of Arab states, the Near East must become the scene of an armaments race. The other speakers agreed with Dr. Bunche that the arms embargo was one of the restrictive conditions which should be removed now that the November 16 resolution had been complied with. Ambassador Warren R. Austin declared that the United States did not intend to allow the export of arms which would permit a competitive race in the area. Export of arms to the area should be strictly limited to legitimate security requirements. The United States, he said, hoped all nations would pursue a similar policy.

Discussion will be resumed on August 8.

### Atomic Energy

The Atomic Energy Commission on July 29 adopted two resolutions, one rejecting further discussions of Soviet proposals calling for immediate preparation of draft conventions on prohibition of atomic weapons and control of atomic energy, and the second, a slightly amended United States resolution suspending Atomic Energy Commission debates until the Commission's six permanent members report that there exists a basis for agreement on an effective atomic-energy-control system. Meanwhile, the Acting Secretary-General has asked for a meeting on August 9 of the 6 sponsoring powers—Canada, China, France, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, and the United States—to begin consultations to determine if a basis for agreement exists on international control of atomic energy to insure its use only for peaceful purposes and for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons.

### Conventional Armaments

The Commission for Conventional Armaments on August 1 adopted the French plan for a census and verification on the armed forces and armaments of the members of the United Nations. The vote was eight in favor to three opposed (Egypt, Ukraine, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). The resolution will be submitted to the Security Council.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics representative replied at length to a charge made at the Commission's meeting on July 25 by the United States representative that the Soviet Union, by a policy of "obstructionism" was blocking progress toward the reduction of armaments because the Soviet Union did not want the world to know how far it had gone in arming for world conquest and in preparations for a third world war. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics representative said that the United States had been unable to provide proof of his allegations because there was no such proof. The United States, the Soviet representative continued, did not want disarmament or prohibition of atomic weapons. In conclusion, he reiterated that the arms-census plan was unacceptable because it provided merely for collection of "military intelligence," and did not foresee measures toward disarmament including atomic-arms reduction.

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### Calendar of Meetings <sup>1</sup>

| Adjourned during July  |                                       |                 |
|--|---------------------------------------|-----------------|
| ITU (International Telecommunication Union):   |                                       | <b>1949</b>     |
| Region II: Fourth Inter-American Radio Conference . . . . .                                | Washington . . . . .                  | May 1-July 9    |
| Administrative Conference to Revise International Telegraph and Telephone Regulations.     | Paris . . . . .                       | May 18-July 29  |
| ILO (International Labor Organization):  |                                       |                 |
| 32d International Labor Conference . . . . .   | Geneva . . . . .                      | June 8-29       |
| Meeting of Executive Representatives of Governments and Specialized Agencies on Migration. | Geneva . . . . .                      | July 18-        |
| WHO (World Health Organization):   |                                       |                 |
| Second World Health Assembly . . . . .   | Rome . . . . .                        | June 13-July 2  |
| Executive Board: Fourth Session . . . . .  | Geneva . . . . .                      | July 8-23       |
| United Nations:  |                                       |                 |
| Narcotic Drugs Supervisory Body: 32d Session . . . . .                                     | Geneva . . . . .                      | June 20-        |
| International Children's Emergency Fund . . . . .  | Lake Success . . . . .                | June 27-July 1  |
| Second World Festival of Films and Fine Arts . . . . .                                     | Knokke-Le Zoute, Belgium . . . . .    | June 18-July 10 |
| Second Inter-American Conference on Indian Life . . . . .                                  | Cuzco, Peru . . . . .                 | June 24-July 4  |
| IMO (International Meteorological Organization):   |                                       |                 |
| Regional Commission VI (Europe): Fourth Meeting . . . . .                                  | London . . . . .                      | June 27-        |
| Executive Council: Annual Session . . . . .  | Lausanne . . . . .                    | July 6-         |
| Preparatory Meeting of International Wheat Council . . . . .                               | Washington . . . . .                  | June 27-July 5  |
| IRO (International Refugee Organization):  |                                       |                 |
| General Council: Third (Special) Session . . . . .   | Geneva . . . . .                      | June 28-        |
| International Philatelic Exhibition . . . . .  | Brussels . . . . .                    | July 1-11       |
| UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization):                 |                                       |                 |
| Meeting of Experts on Copyright . . . . .  | Paris . . . . .                       | July 4-         |
| 12th International Conference on Public Education . . . . .                                | Geneva . . . . .                      | July 4-12       |
| Conference to Establish an International Council on Arts in General Education.             | Paris . . . . .                       | July 18-22      |
| Meeting of Commission on Technical Needs in Press, Radio and Films.                        | Paris . . . . .                       | July 25-        |
| International Wheat Council: First Session . . . . .                                       | Washington . . . . .                  | July 6-9        |
| First Pan American Congress of Engineering . . . . .                                       | São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.         | July 8-24       |
| Second Pan American Congress of Social Service . . . . .                                   | Rio de Janeiro . . . . .              | July 10-17      |
| FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):   |                                       |                 |
| Third World Forestry Congress . . . . .  | Helsinki . . . . .                    | July 10-20      |
| Third International Congress of Toponymy and Anthroponymy . . . . .                        | Brussels . . . . .                    | July 15-19      |
| Conference for the Revision of the 1945 Bermuda Telecommunications Agreement.              | London . . . . .                      | July 21-        |
| <b>In Session as of August 1, 1949</b>   |                                       |                 |
| United Nations:  |                                       | <b>1949</b>     |
| Conciliation Commission for Palestine . . . . .  | Haifa, Jerusalem and Rhodes . . . . . | Jan. 17-        |
| Interim Committee of the General Assembly . . . . .  | Lake Success . . . . .                | Jan 31-         |

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State.



## Calendar of Meetings—Continued

### United Nations—Continued

Security Council Commission on India and Pakistan . . . . .  
Trusteeship Council: Fifth Session . . . . .  
Economic and Social Council: Ninth Session . . . . .

New Delhi . . . . .  
Lake Success . . . . .  
Geneva . . . . .

**1949**  
February  
June 15-  
July 5-

### ITU (International Telecommunication Union): Provisional Frequency Board . . . . .

Geneva . . . . .

**1948**  
Jan. 15-

Region I Frequency Conference . . . . .  
Region III Frequency Conference . . . . .  
Meeting of the Technical Plan Committee of the International  
High Frequency Broadcasting Conference.  
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): Third Session of  
the Contracting Parties.  
Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM): Deputies for Austria . . . . .  
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization  
(UNESCO): International Congress on Problems of Illiteracy  
and Adult Education.

Geneva . . . . .  
Geneva . . . . .  
Paris . . . . .

**1949**  
May 18-  
May 18-  
June 23-

Annecy, France . . . . .

April 8-

London . . . . .

June 30-

Rio de Janeiro . . . . .

July 27-

### Scheduled August 1, 1949—October 31, 1949

#### ITU (International Telecommunication Union): International Administrative Aeronautical Radio Conference: Second Session . . . . .

Geneva . . . . .

Aug. 1-

Geneva . . . . .

Aug. 15-

Geneva . . . . .

Oct. 19-

#### Special Administrative Radio Conference for the Adoption of a New Frequency List.

#### FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):

Meeting of Specialists on Agriculture Extension . . . . .  
Meeting of Specialists on Improvement of Dairy Production and  
Marketing.

Europe . . . . .

Aug. 1-28

Reading, England . . . . .

Aug. 1-29

Meeting of Specialists on Foot and Mouth Disease Control . . . . .  
Fourth Meeting of Technical Committee on Wood Chemistry . . . . .  
Conference on Locust Control . . . . .

London . . . . .

Aug. 14-

Brussels . . . . .

August

Central America . . . . .

September

Geneva . . . . .

September

Washington . . . . .

September

Undetermined . . . . .

September

Cairo . . . . .

Oct. 3-

Meeting of Technical Committee on Food Composition . . . . .  
European Forestry and Forest Products Commission . . . . .  
Near East Regional Meeting on Animal Breeding Under Tropical  
and Subtropical Conditions.

#### Meeting of the International Penal and Penitentiary Com- mission.

Bern . . . . .

Aug. 1-

#### Inter-American Commission of Women: Special Assembly . . . . .

Buenos Aires . . . . .

Aug. 8-

#### XIV International Veterinary Congress . . . . .

London . . . . .

Aug. 8-

#### Tenth International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art . . . . .

Venice . . . . .

Aug. 11-

#### United Nations:

Social Welfare Seminar in Middle East . . . . .  
Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of  
Resources.

Beirut . . . . .

Aug. 15-

Lake Success . . . . .

Aug. 17-

#### Conference on Road and Motor Transport . . . . .

Geneva . . . . .

Aug. 23-

#### Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc):

Subcommission on Statistical Sampling . . . . .

Lake Success . . . . .

Sept. 5-

Social Commission: Fifth Session . . . . .

Lake Success . . . . .

Sept. 20-

General Assembly: Fourth Session . . . . .

Lake Success . . . . .

Sept. 26-

Permanent Central Opium Board: 54th Session . . . . .

Geneva . . . . .

September

Interim Coordinating Committee for International Commodity  
Arrangements.

Lake Success . . . . .

September

Narcotic Drugs Supervisory Body: 33rd Session . . . . .

Geneva . . . . .

Oct. 5-

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: Fifth Session . . . . .

Singapore . . . . .

Oct. 20-

Economic Commission for Latin America: Third Session . . . . .

Undetermined . . . . .

November

Twelfth International Dairy Congress . . . . .

Stockholm . . . . .

Aug. 15-

#### UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization):

Committee of Experts on Engineering Sciences . . . . .

Paris . . . . .

Aug. 16-

Committee of Experts on Reproduction in Visual Art . . . . .

Paris . . . . .

Aug. 22-

International Technical Conference on the Protection of Nature . . . . .

United States . . . . .

Aug. 22

Executive Board: 16th Session . . . . .

Paris . . . . .

Sept. 3-16

Committee of Experts on Exchange of Persons Problems . . . . .

Paris . . . . .

Sept. 9-

General Conference: Fourth Session . . . . .

Paris . . . . .

Sept. 19-

Meeting of Experts on the Comparative Studies of Civilization . . . . .

Paris . . . . .

Oct. 24-

Fifth International Congress on Microbiology . . . . .

Rio de Janeiro . . . . .

Aug. 17-

First International Congress of Biochemistry . . . . .

Cambridge, England . . . . .

Aug. 19-25

## Calendar of Meetings—Continued

|  |                              | 1949                |
|--|------------------------------|---------------------|
| Izmir International Fair . . . . .   | Izmir, Turkey . . . . .      | Aug. 20-            |
| Conference on Plant and Animal Nutrition in Relation to Soil and Climatic Factors. . . . .                           | Australia . . . . .          | Aug. 22-            |
| International Seed Testing Association: Meeting of the Constitutional Committee. . . . .                             | Belfast . . . . .            | Aug. 24-            |
| International Association for Research in Income and Wealth . . . . .  | Cambridge, England . . . . . | Aug. 27-            |
| Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. . . . .  | Switzerland . . . . .        | August or September |
| International Labor Organization (ILO):  |                              |                     |
| Permanent Agricultural Committee: Third Session . . . . .  | Geneva . . . . .             | Sept. 1-            |
| Technical Tripartite Conference on Safety in Coal Mines . . . . .  | Geneva . . . . .             | Sept. 12-           |
| Seventh International Conference of Labor Statisticians . . . . .  | Geneva . . . . .             | Oct. 17-29          |
| Tripartite Conference on Rhine Navigation . . . . .  | Geneva . . . . .             | October             |
| Metal Trades Industrial Committee: Third Session . . . . .   | Geneva . . . . .             | September           |
| Cannes Film Festival . . . . .   | Cannes . . . . .             | Sept. 2-            |
| International Statistical Institute: 26th Session . . . . .  | Bern . . . . .               | Sept. 3-10          |
| Budapest International Fair . . . . .  | Budapest . . . . .           | Sept. 3-18          |
| 29th International Congress of Americanists . . . . .  | New York City . . . . .      | Sept. 5-12          |
| International Union of Chemistry: 15th General Conference . . . . .  | Amsterdam . . . . .          | Sept. 6-10          |
| Vienna International Fair . . . . .  | Vienna . . . . .             | Sept. 11-           |
| International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: Fourth Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors. . . . .      | Washington . . . . .         | Sept. 13-           |
| International Monetary Fund: Fourth Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors. . . . .                                | Washington . . . . .         | Sept. 13-           |
| Third North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement Conference (NARBA). . . . .                                     | Ottawa . . . . .             | Sept. 13-           |
| International Council of Scientific Unions: General Assembly . . . . .   | Copenhagen . . . . .         | Sept. 14-16         |
| Marseilles International Fair . . . . .  | Marseilles . . . . .         | Sept. 25-           |
| International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO):  |                              |                     |
| Legal Committee: Fifth Session . . . . .   | Montreal . . . . .           | September           |
| Council: Eighth Session . . . . .  | Montreal . . . . .           | September           |
| Pan American Institute of Geography and History: First Pan American Consultation of Commission on Geography. . . . . | Rio de Janeiro . . . . .     | September           |
| Royal Netherlands Industry Fair . . . . .  | Utrecht . . . . .            | September           |
| XVII International Navigation Congress . . . . .   | Lisbon . . . . .             | September           |
| Fourth International Congress on Neurology . . . . .   | Paris . . . . .              | September           |
| International Commission for Uniform Methods of Sugar Analysis . . . . .   | Praha . . . . .              | September           |
| Inter-American Council of Jurists: First Session . . . . .   | Rio de Janeiro . . . . .     | September           |
| Pan American Sanitary Organization: Executive Committee:   |                              |                     |
| Eighth Meeting . . . . .   | Lima . . . . .               | Oct. 3-5            |
| Ninth Meeting . . . . .  | Lima . . . . .               | Oct. 13-15          |
| Directing Council: Third Meeting . . . . .   | Lima . . . . .               | Oct. 6-12           |

### Alvin Anderson Named U.S. Member Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission

The Secretary of State announced July 28 that the President has named Alvin Anderson, Director of Fisheries of the State of Washington, as a United States member of the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission, United States and Canada. The appointment of Mr. Anderson fills the vacancy created by the resignation of Milo Moore who is at present in charge of the Greek fisheries program for the Economic Cooperation Administration.

The International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission is charged, by treaty between the United States and Canada, with the duty of conserving and rebuilding the sockeye salmon fishery

of the Fraser River System of British Columbia. Spawning in the far reaches of the river system, these salmon migrate to the Pacific Ocean where they are caught by the fishermen of both countries. At the height of its productivity this fishery yielded in one year 2,400,000 cases of the finest quality salmon. Later the yield was reduced to a tenth of that figure. The large runs that have been observed this year give every indication that the work of this International Commission is proving successful in restoring the potentially valuable sockeye salmon fishery to its former high rate of production.

Other United States members on the Commission are: Edward W. Allen, attorney, of Seattle, now serving as chairman, and Albert M. Day, Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior.

## U.K., U.S., Canada To Discuss Atomic Energy Information

Statement by the President

[Released to the press by the White House July 28]

On July 14 I consulted with a group of Congressional leaders, including ranking members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, concerning certain problems which this country faces in the field of atomic energy. Since that time members of the administration have held discussions with Congressional leaders, particularly with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Further discussions will take place, as it is essential that action in this field which so vitally affects the security of the country be based on a wide area of agreement between the executive and legislative branches of the government.

In this field it is important that the people of the country be kept informed to the greatest extent consistent with the requirements of national security, and in a manner consistent with the orderly processes of consultation between the legislative and executive branches of the government. I feel I can now mention briefly some of the factors involved in the problem.

As a result of consultation among American, British, and Canadian scientists beginning in 1939, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada agreed in 1943 to concentrate a major effort in the United States for the purpose of producing an atomic bomb at the earliest possible time. A British scientific mission participated extensively in the research and development and later in the production of atomic bombs at Los Alamos. They participated in the preparation for, and the evaluation of, the Bikini tests. Similar scientific missions were assigned to research and development work concerned with the construction and operation of the principal plants for the separation of U-235 at Oak Ridge. British and Canadian scientists consulted our scientific and technical personnel at the Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago on the design of the heavy water reactor which they subsequently built at Chalk River, Canada.

Early in 1947 the three countries adopted a uniform system for handling the information which had been jointly developed and for determining what should be kept secret and what was appropriate for public release.

In January, 1948, the three governments agreed upon a *modus vivendi* which provided for cooperation among the three countries involving exchange of scientific and technical information in certain defined areas and collaboration on matters of raw material supply of common concern. These arrangements were made after consultation with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. These arrangements are limited in scope and duration. It is necessary to consider the future, taking into account the developments made in this field by the three countries, and to maintain the *status quo* while this consideration takes place.

We, therefore, intend to explore with the United Kingdom and Canada some of the basic questions underlying any determination of long-range policy in this field. These are questions which will require further consultations with the Congress following the exploratory conversations. I wish to emphasize that these exploratory conversations do not involve making agreements with, or commitments to, the British and Canadians on these questions. They involve having talks with the British and Canadians prior to further consultations with the Congress. In these consultations with the Congress, we shall have to decide together what course of action it is wisest to take.

## Henry Parkman Named U.S. Representative on Ruhr Authority

The White House on July 28 announced the appointment of Henry Parkman, of Boston, as the United States representative to the International Authority for the Ruhr.

Mr. Parkman, a lawyer, legislator, soldier, and former governmental affairs adviser to General Clay in Berlin, will assume his duties at the Ruhr Authority headquarters at Dusseldorf and expects to be present for the next formal meeting on August 8.

The Ruhr Authority was created by an agreement signed by the United States, United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg on April 28, 1949. Each member government has a representative on the Council of the Authority. The first organizational meeting of the Council was held in London the latter part of May.



## Military Assistance Program Transmitted to the Congress

### MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT<sup>1</sup>

*To the Congress of the United States:*

To continue and strengthen our program for world peace and national security, I recommend that the Congress enact legislation authorizing military aid to free nations to enable them to protect themselves against the threat of aggression and contribute more effectively to the collective defense of world peace.

Such legislation is an essential part of our efforts to create an international structure capable of maintaining law and order among nations. Our prosperity and security, as well as that of other free nations depend upon our success in establishing conditions of international order. Increased assurances against the danger of aggression are needed to support our international economic programs, and in particular the European Recovery Program, which are so vital to the building of a stable world.

Under the Charter of the United Nations, each member nation is bound to settle international differences by peaceful means, and to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territory of any country. Thus, in joining the United Nations, the nations have given their assent to the basic principles of international peace and security.

We have, however, learned the unfortunate truth that this obligation, by itself, is not sufficient at the present time to eliminate the fear of aggression and international violence. The record of world events since 1945 offers us no certainty that all members of the United Nations will uphold these principles of peace in actual practice. Indeed, there is proof to the contrary, proof that in the pursuit of selfish ends some nations have resorted and may again resort to the threat or use of force. The fear created by this experience

haunts the world and creates conditions of insecurity and instability which stand in the way of economic and social progress.

To reduce this danger and to allay these fears, we have taken additional steps to reinforce the obligations of the Charter. Under the pact of Rio de Janeiro and in the North Atlantic Treaty, we are creating a framework of mutual obligation to prevent international violence in the Western Hemisphere and in the North Atlantic area. These treaties provide support for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Furthermore, even in the absence of such compacts, we have refused to tolerate assaults on the integrity of peace-loving nations whose conduct conforms to the principles of the Charter. We have given military as well as diplomatic aid directly to nations threatened by aggression. Through our aid to Greece and Turkey, we have recognized the fact that, if the principles of international peace are to prevail, free nations must have the means as well as the will to resist aggression.

So long as the danger of aggression exists, it is necessary to think in terms of the forces required to prevent it. It is unfortunate that this is true. We cannot, however, achieve our goal of permanent peace by ignoring the difficult and unpleasant tasks that lie in the way. We need to show the same firmness and resolution in defending the principles of peace that we have shown in enunciating them. The better prepared the free nations are to resist aggression, the less likelihood there is that they will have to use the forces they have prepared. The policemen in our communities seldom have to use their weapons, but public peace would be greatly endangered if they did not have them.

The preparation of the military means for keeping the peace is necessary not only to the security of the United States but also to building a safe and prosperous world society.

<sup>1</sup> Also printed as H. Doc. 276, 81st Cong., 1st sess.

Helping free nations to acquire the means of defending themselves is an obligation of the leadership we have assumed in world affairs. Within the practical limits of our resources, we must strive to act with foresight and precision, so that our strength and the collective strength of the free peoples associated with us will be most effective.

To be effective, the aid which we supply to other nations for defending themselves must be planned ahead. It must not be wasted. It must be carefully allocated to meet the realities of our own security. Above all, it is urgent to initiate a program of aid promptly if we are not to lose the momentum already gained toward recovery and political stability.

These general requirements are given sharp emphasis by consideration of the specific cases where aid is needed. Many anxious governments have requested our military assistance. Among these requests, there can be no more meaningful appeals than those which have come from the countries of Western Europe. It is entirely logical that these governments should turn to us and that we should help them. Their defense is our defense and is of deep concern to us. Twice in one generation we have found that we had to join with them in fighting against aggressor nations in order to preserve our freedom and the freedom of other democratic countries.

The principal task of the free nations of Western Europe in the last four years has been to restore their war-shattered economies. The inherent difficulties of this task have been aggravated by the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, which has done its utmost to prevent European recovery. Full economic recovery requires peaceful conditions and the assurance that the work of labor, industry, and agriculture will not be swept away in an outburst of international violence. In place of these conditions, the Soviet Union, with its violent propaganda, its manipulation of the conspiratorial activities of the world Communist movement, and its maintenance of one of the largest peacetime armies in history, has deliberately created an atmosphere of fear and danger.

In the face of what has occurred in Greece, and in Berlin, in the face of the threats and pressures to which Iran and Turkey have been exposed, in the light of the suppression of human liberty in countries under Communist control, the nations of Western Europe have not been able to ignore the necessity of a military defense for themselves. They have seen what the Soviet Union has done to nations for which it professed friendship and with which it was recently allied. They have observed how a Communist *coup d'état*, operating in the shadow of the massed military might of the Soviet Union, can overthrow, at one stroke, the

democratic liberties and the political independence of a friendly nation.

As a consequence of that experience, and in the light of the fact that the two most devastating wars in history originated in Europe, they realize that they must have a shield against aggression to shelter their political institutions and the re-birth of their own economic and social life.

The nations of Western Europe have addressed themselves in all seriousness to the task of providing such a shield. In the treaty of Brussels, five nations of Western Europe established joint measures for their own defense. In support of that treaty, they have coordinated both their defensive strategy and their plans to produce necessary military supplies.

Those five nations, together with Norway, Denmark, and Italy, have undertaken annual military expenditures equivalent to about five and one-half billion dollars. This is the maximum amount they are able to spend without seriously interfering with the civilian production necessary for their economic recovery. This amount is not, however, enough to furnish these nations the protection they need. Concentrating, as they are, on restoring their economic stability, they are unable to spare the plants and the materials required to bring their defense establishments up to the necessary levels. Furthermore, there are certain items essential for their defense which they are not equipped to provide for themselves. They have, therefore, come to us with urgent requests for assistance in providing the necessary margin of arms and equipment which will make them better able to repel aggression and mitigate the anxieties of their peoples.

I recommend that we supply these countries with assistance of three types: First, a limited amount of dollar aid to enable them to increase their own production of military items without impairing their efforts for economic recovery; second, the direct transfer of certain essential items of military equipment, and third, the assistance of experts in the production and use of military equipment and the training of personnel. Such a program will enable these countries to acquire the elements necessary to their defense without hampering their recovery.

The military assistance which we propose for these countries will be limited to that which is necessary to help them create mobile defensive forces. Our objective is to see to it that these nations are equipped, in the shortest possible time, with compact and effectively trained forces capable of maintaining internal order and resisting the initial phases of external aggression.

At the present time, the military power which is the greatest deterrent to aggression is centered in the United States, three thousand miles away from Europe. It must be made clear that the United States has no intention, in the event of aggression, of allowing the peoples of Western

Europe to be overrun before its own power can be brought to bear. The program of military assistance now proposed is a tangible assurance of our purpose in this regard.

Outside of Western Europe we are already engaged in a program of military assistance to Greece and Turkey. This program has been in effect since May 1947. The Communist effort in Greece, in the form of a guerrilla war supported from abroad, has been condemned by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Our aid to Greece has checked this attempt to overthrow the political independence of a free nation. It is important that present gains against the guerrillas be maintained and that the operations be pressed to a successful conclusion. Only if this is done, can the economic reconstruction of Greece be accomplished.

In Turkey, our aid has lessened the burden of military preparedness which the threatening pressure of the Soviet Union had imposed on a primarily agrarian economy. Although the Turkish defense system has been improved, additional equipment and maintenance parts are needed for the modernization of certain Turkish defense units.

We are also confronted by the necessity of making military assistance available in other areas of the world outside Europe.

In Iran the use of surpluses of United States military equipment has aided in improving the defensive effectiveness of the Iranian Army and the maintenance of internal order. It is now necessary to provide certain additional items to round out this program, and thereby to strengthen the ability of Iran to defend its independence.

The new Republic of Korea, established as a result of free elections held under the auspices of the United Nations, is menaced by the Communist regime in the northern part of the country. With the advice and assistance of the United States, the Korean Government has established a small force to protect its internal security and defend itself against outside aggression short of a full scale war. Equipment has been requested from the United States for minimum army and coast guard forces. It is essential to the survival of the Korean Republic that this assistance be made available.

In addition, it is necessary to continue our program of limited aid to the Republic of the Philippines, which was originated under the Act of June 26, 1946.

In this hemisphere we have assumed obligations of mutual defense with the other American Republics under the pact of Rio de Janeiro. Our northern neighbor, Canada, is a party with us to the North Atlantic Treaty. It is important under the terms of these two treaties that we

should assist Canada and the American Republics to establish adequate defenses properly coordinated with our own.

In view of our limited resources, it is impossible for us to assist on a grant basis all countries whose defense is related to our own. We can afford to bear the cost of military aid only with respect to those countries vital to our national security where the danger is greatest, and where the ability to pay for military equipment is least. With respect to such countries as Canada and the American Republics, therefore, I recommend that our assistance be limited to the use of the facilities of our government to procure defense equipment for them at their own expense.

All these various requirements for military assistance should obviously be handled in a unified program, adaptable in its administration to the operation of our foreign policy.

The sum which will be needed in new appropriations for the fiscal year 1950 for all the grant programs now contemplated, together with a margin for emergencies, is approximately \$1,450,000,000. The bulk of the supplies to be procured under these programs will be delivered over the next two years. Of this total, \$50,000,000 has recently been requested for the interim continuation of our program of military aid to Greece and Turkey under existing authorizations. New authorization will be required for \$1,400,000,000.

The major portion of the total is to be devoted to the needs of the Western European nations. It is not proposed that specific sums be committed in advance to particular countries. Rather, the President should be able to make allocations as circumstances require.

The aid we provide will constitute only a minor fraction of what these countries will spend themselves. Agreements will be executed with the recipients, to provide for mutual assistance and to assure proper use of the equipment furnished. The recipient nations will be required to limit the use of the items supplied to the defense of agreed geographic areas, and will not be permitted to transfer them to other nations without the consent of the United States. The President should be authorized to terminate our aid at any time. Aid will be terminated in the event that a recipient acts in a manner inconsistent with the policies and purposes of the program or with its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.

The recommended program covers the most pressing current needs for military aid. How long it may be necessary to continue military aid depends on many unpredictable factors. Our burden will undoubtedly lessen as our program for peace brings its returns. Advancing economic recovery will enable the free nations to sustain a larger share of the expense of their own defense measures. Progress toward a peaceful settlement of international differences will reduce the threat of violence, and lighten the cost of preparedness.



Ultimately, when the peaceful principles of the United Nations are fully realized, the protection of the peace may be assigned to the security forces of that organization.

If this program of military aid is to succeed, we must prosecute it promptly and vigorously. Our policies for peace are having the desired effect. We cannot afford to lose the momentum we have already gained.

One need only look back to the situation with which we were confronted two and one-half years ago to be convinced of the rightness of our course of action. At that time the free nations of Europe were not only exposed and defenseless, but they were also caught in an economic impasse which threatened the existence of their democratic forms of government. Europe, with its great storehouse of skills and its heritage of free institutions, seemed about to disintegrate and to fall piece by piece under the sway of totalitarian control.

The fact that such a disaster has been averted should inspire us with confidence in the ultimate triumph of the cause of peace and freedom not only in Europe but elsewhere in the world.

Like the North Atlantic Treaty, this program of military aid is entirely defensive in character. By strengthening the defense establishments of the free nations, it will increase the confidence of the peoples of the world in a peaceful future and protect the growth of world recovery.

I would not suggest that this program alone will bring present international tensions to an end. It will, however, preserve the initiative which the free nations of the world now have, and help to create a world structure so firm economically and militarily as to convince any potential aggressor nation that its own welfare lies in the direction of mutual tolerance and peaceful foreign relations.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
July 25, 1949.

#### STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON<sup>1</sup>

The Military Assistance Program which the President has recommended to the Congress is most urgently needed. I hope that upon an analysis of the facts the Committee will share my deep conviction that adoption of the program at this time is essential to reach the objectives of the United States in foreign affairs.

The proposed Military Assistance Program cannot be regarded as an isolated piece of legislation unrelated to our whole foreign policy. Much more than military assistance, important as that

is, is involved. What is also at stake here is the continuation with undiminished vigor of the great concerted effort the United States is making, in company with other nations of like purpose, to assure peace and security in the world. This effort has been expressed, on the part of the United States, in an unbroken succession of positive measures which have substantially advanced the cause of world peace with freedom and justice and have materially strengthened our own security.

The Military Assistance Program must be judged in the broad context of our whole foreign policy. It follows in the sequence of measures which we have undertaken to accomplish the primary purpose of our foreign policy—the establishment of the conditions of peace and security in which the United States and the other free nations can endure and prosper.

The enactment of the Military Assistance Program would assure the continuance in full force of the positive leadership which the United States is asserting in behalf of the free world. The failure to provide military assistance to those joined with us in that effort would reverse the affirmative and effective policy which this country has thus far pursued.

Such a negative response to the challenge that still confronts us would inevitably weaken the confidence of the other free peoples in the determination of the United States to carry out the task we have jointly undertaken. A reversal of the course we have been pursuing to such good effect would hearten those who seek by unremitting pressure to wear down, overawe or overwhelm all who resist the imposition of an alien and abhorrent system. Any sign of weakness or irresolution on our part now would seriously jeopardize all the gains we have made so far toward the achievement of peace and security in the only kind of world in which we would want to live.

It is not in keeping with the American character to quit at the halfway mark, before the course is run. I firmly believe that the American people will want to spare no effort to realize our goal of a secure and peaceful world. It is my conviction that an adequate program of military assistance is essential to the attainment of that goal.

Twice in our lifetime threats to the security of the United States have arisen and have been allowed to develop unchecked until we found ourselves fighting for our existence as a free people. Neither time did we act with sufficient foresight and vigor either to dissipate the threat or adequately prepare ourselves to meet it. We are determined henceforth to profit from these tragic experiences and to eliminate or neutralize any new threat to our security before it gets out of hand.

This determination of the American people to be forewarned and forearmed was evident even before the conclusion of the recent war. There was also evident a realization that in the modern

<sup>1</sup> Made before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 28, 1949, and released to the press on the same date.

world no nation, no matter how powerful or resolute, can hope to achieve security and prosperity by its own efforts alone. There was a clear understanding that the only possible way in which a just and peaceful world order could be organized was by the collective action of the peoples dedicated to peace.

On the basis of that conviction, which was shared by many others, the United States undertook the leadership of the movement to organize the postwar world for collective security. We were concerned with far more than security in a restricted sense. What we envisaged, and what we put into effect, was a broad constructive effort in which the nations of the world could cooperate to achieve peace, freedom and an increasing measure of material well-being for all peoples.

The concrete expression of that ideal is the United Nations, the most ambitious and comprehensive attempt in history to organize the nations of the world for peace and progress on a universal basis. As we well know, the United Nations has not been able to function as it was intended because of the obstruction of a small minority of the members. But this does not invalidate the principle of collective action. When the effort to achieve collective security through the United Nations was impeded by a recalcitrant minority, the free nations of the majority proceeded with the search for collective security on as broad a base as possible.

The United States has continued its leadership in the movement for collective security, which we are still convinced is the only principle on which a just and enduring peace can be achieved. We have continued to support and strengthen the United Nations and have adhered to its principles and purposes. We have initiated and are carrying out, in cooperation with other free nations, a whole series of measures designed not only to keep the peace by collective action but also to neutralize and forestall the threat to the security and well-being of free peoples.

The record of these undertakings and their results is impressive: Postwar relief, aid to Greece and Turkey, the European Recovery Program, and most recently the North Atlantic Treaty, just approved by the Senate by a resounding vote of 82 to 13.

Each of these measures, and a number of others, has made an important contribution to the progress we have achieved. But none was sufficient alone. The totality of our effort is what has given renewed strength and vitality to the free world and has brought us thus far safely through great dangers. The momentum must be maintained if we are to accomplish our purpose. The Military Assistance Program is necessary to sustain the advance and carry us further along the way which

we have every reason to believe leads to peace and security for ourselves and others.

We may wish for a number of reasons that it were not necessary to add military assistance to the heavy responsibilities we already bear but we cannot escape the inexorable logic of the facts of life in the world as it is.

One of the facts we must face is that the free nations of Western Europe, with whose security our own security is bound up, are incapable today of defending themselves against a major armed attack. Another fact is that the Soviet Union today maintains the largest peacetime military force in the history of the world, while exerting iron-fisted control over its neighbors and pursuing a policy of exploiting any evidence of weakness in others.

The combination of these two facts—a huge aggressive force on one side and admittedly inadequate defense forces on the other—has created a morbid and pervasive sense of insecurity in Western Europe. The fear is justified. The danger is real, however much some may try to argue it out of existence. The Soviet Union and the Western world are still far apart on fundamental issues. Until the nations of Western Europe are sufficiently strengthened to regain confidence in their ability to defend themselves, their sense of insecurity will impede economic recovery and impair the will of the people that now exists to resist Communist-infiltration aggression if it should come. Restoration of their belief in their own capacity to resist will release new energy for the recovery effort and stiffen the determination to fight back if attacked. It is in our interest, as well as Western Europe's to achieve these effects. They will be promoted by the Military Assistance Program.

The legislation presented for your consideration would authorize the President, on request, to furnish military assistance to nations which have joined with the United States in collective regional arrangements based on principles of self-help and mutual aid, and to other nations whose increased ability to defend themselves against aggression is important to our national interest. It authorizes the appropriation of \$1,400,000,000 for the fiscal year 1950 which, together with the \$50,000,000 separately requested for interim military aid to Greece and Turkey, will make a total of \$1,450,000,000 available for obligation for foreign military assistance. The President is directed to terminate assistance to any nation when it so requests or when the furnishing of assistance to that nation would be inconsistent with our national interest or with our obligation under the Charter of the United Nations to refrain from aiding nations against which preventive or enforcement action is taken.

Within the governmental structure the program will be centrally controlled. It is proposed, in view of the inseparability of actions taken under



this legislation from the day-to-day administration of our foreign policy, that the central direction be exercised by the Department of State. In time of peace, the several instruments of our foreign policy must be wielded as a closely integrated unit if we are to achieve our objectives fully within reasonable cost. The Department will exercise that direction in close collaboration with other governmental agencies, particularly the National Military Establishment and the Economic Cooperation Administration, with each agency contributing what it is best able to provide for the success of the program. Thus, for example, the National Military Establishment will provide equipment from its stocks, military advice, and training assistance, and will utilize its procurement facilities for placing orders for the balance of the end items required. The Economic Cooperation Administration will provide the necessary coordination with the European Recovery Program, seeing to it that our paramount interest in economic recovery is not jeopardized by the recipient nations undertaking a military effort on too large a scale.

Insofar as possible, the program will be administered abroad through existing diplomatic and military channels. In this way it will be best integrated with the other overseas operations of our foreign policy.

Of the funds for which authorization is requested, it is presently contemplated that approximately 1.1 billion dollars will be used to furnish military assistance to European signatories of the North Atlantic pact. The balance will be used for assistance to other countries which are in the immediate area of Soviet pressure. This will permit the continuation of the Greek-Turkish program, which has been so effective in preventing the independence of those countries from being lost through external machinations against the will of the Greek and Turkish people. There is reasonable ground for anticipating that operations against Greek guerrillas may be brought to a successful conclusion in the near future.

Grant assistance is also contemplated for the Republic of Korea, where a government constituted as a result of free elections under the auspices of the United Nations is menaced by the threat of internal subversion and external force; for Iran, which under severe external pressures has strictly maintained its independence and to which this government has accorded limited military assistance in the form of credit for the purchase of surplus equipment and has sent two United States military missions; and for the Philippine Republic as a continuation of our aid originated under the Act of June 26, 1946.

Since our resources are limited, the weight of our effort must be brought to bear in those Euro-

pean countries which are most vital to our national security where the threat of aggression is most immediate, where our aid will be most effective, and where the ability of the economy to stand the financial strain of military expenditure is the least.

Nevertheless, there are other areas in which an increase of defensive strength is highly desirable in the interest of our security. We are bound with our American Republic friends and neighbors in the Rio pact of mutual assistance. Under this program, we intend to help them in procuring equipment. Equipment will be made available to them on a cash-reimbursement basis in accordance with a provision of the proposed legislation especially designed to help meet the procurement problems of the American Republics and certain other friendly countries. In order to enable these countries to utilize the procurement facilities of the military services without the necessity of immobilizing their scarce dollars from the time of placing an order for equipment to the time of delivery, the legislation would authorize the President to enter into contracts on behalf of the United States for procurement of such equipment upon a firm undertaking that the recipient nation will make reimbursement before delivery.

This provision will also, of course, prove to be of considerable value to Canada. In addition, we are continuing to exchange with the Canadians vital information on weapons and plans which will contribute to the common defense, and we are going forward with such important matters of mutual interest as standardization of arms and equipment.

By combining these several measures into a coordinated whole, we shall be able to make military assistance available in accordance with our overall political objectives, economic capabilities and strategic interests.

Of course, all possible contingencies cannot be foreseen at this time. Should the national interests of the United States require, the President would be able to reallocate funds as between recipient nations presently included in the program and also to aid nations to whom assistance is not now contemplated. In order to minimize the need for reallocation, a small emergency fund is provided so that we may take prompt action to meet international situations which might suddenly develop. Any modifications in the program would nevertheless have to be in accordance with the policy expressed in section 2 of the draft legislation, namely, support of collective defense and regional arrangements or of nations whose defense is important to the national interest of the United States.

This one-year program represents no more than about one-fifth of the military expenditures which the recipient nations are already making during this fiscal year for themselves and for each other.



Just as in the case of the European Recovery Program, they and we intend that our help supplement their own efforts to help themselves. There is clear evidence of accomplishment and intent on the part of the recipients to help themselves and each other. Details of the extensive measures of self-help and mutual aid already initiated by the free nations of Western Europe will be given to you in the testimony of other witnesses. It must be understood, however, that the recipient nations cannot achieve an adequate defensive position by themselves. Many essential materials and equipment can be bought only with dollars, and if they had the dollars available we would not be under the necessity of contributing to their economic recovery. Furthermore, a military production effort by these countries on too large a scale would divert materials, manpower and facilities vital to their own economic recovery efforts. To detract in any significant degree from those recovery efforts would be like building the walls of a house while tearing out its foundation. In order to enhance the ability of Western Europe to provide for its own defense, a not insignificant part of the assistance planned for it consists of items which will increase its own industrial military production.

It is nevertheless scarcely likely that the recipient nations will be in a position to make their contribution to world security and the defense of their area at the end of this one-year period without further outside assistance. If we do not assist these nations in achieving that position, the comparative cost to us in future years of preserving our own security will be considerably greater. It must be our objective to achieve the necessary measure of security for us at the minimum drain on our own economy. The achievement of that objective requires that we be associated with free nations who are strong. The magnitude of our assistance in future years will be reduced by the increased industrial potential of the recipient countries and by the fact that the first year's program contains many capital items which need not be renewed in peacetime. But I cannot hope at this time to predict for how long contributions of this character will be required of us. The rate of economic recovery, the imminence and extent of the aggressive threat, as well as strategic considerations and developments in the art of warfare, are all elements to be taken into account. There are too many variables in the equation, and the determination of these variables does not depend upon us alone.

With respect to the European members of the North Atlantic pact, a program in future years will be derived from recommendations made by the organization to be established under article 9

of the treaty. We will then be dealing with what action our government should take on those recommendations with respect to the provision of mutual aid under article 3 of the treaty. Those recommendations will of course be examined in the light of the aid other members will be invited to contribute under article 3. However, as has been repeatedly stated, that is not the problem with which we are now dealing. As witnesses from the National Military Establishment will explain in more detail, the amount requested is urgently necessary in the interest of our national security. It is the minimum amount required to enable the recipient nations adequately to guard against internal subversion and to begin to undertake their logical and necessary roles in a coordinated collective defense effort.

Some who oppose this program do so because they fear that by sending arms to other nations we should be increasing the chances of war or, alternatively, that the arms we give might some day be used against us. On the contrary, I am convinced that failure to reinforce the determination of free nations to defend themselves against subversion from within and aggression from without may invite a combination of political and military aggression. If they should have to defend themselves, it is obvious that their resistance would be more effective with the arms we propose to supply than without them. These are nations with proud histories and great traditions.

The existence of Communist groups in some of these countries is a reason for, and not against, supplying arms. The danger from these Communist elements reached its peak before the moderate governments of Western Europe proved that they were too strong to be overthrown by subversion. Since these governments proved themselves capable of overcoming internal threats to their security, Communist strength and influence in Western Europe have been steadily reduced. Military assistance from the United States would further strengthen the hand of the democratic governments in dealing with either internal disorders or repelling aggression if it should come.

Fears that the Military Assistance Program might set off an international armament race or provoke the Soviet Union to war, in my considered opinion, are groundless. What is proposed is not a vast increase in the armies of Western Europe, but the supplying of certain key items of arms and equipment for the very modest forces which the Europeans have already provided for in their budgets. The Soviet Government is well aware that those forces are for defense purposes only and cannot possibly menace the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union knows that the democratic nations have not the desire, the intention, or the size of forces for conducting aggression. The people of Western Europe seek only the means of defending their own homes.

Moreover, the armed forces of Western Europe

and their equipment, whether supplied from Europe or from the United States, would be subject to any international agreement for the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments under the United Nations Charter. The United Nations is developing plans for the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces. It is clear, however, that agreement to put armaments regulation into effect cannot be realized in the absence of international confidence and mutual trust. Until such an agreement is a reality, the free nations have no other recourse than to strengthen their own defenses against the threat of the far larger forces maintained by the Soviet Union.

Assertions have been made that the threat to Western European security is not primarily military but political in nature, and that a military assistance program is out of step with the realities. It is quite true that the Western European struggle for freedom has so far been fought with political and economic weapons. It is equally true, however, that throughout this struggle there has been in existence behind the Iron Curtain the greatest peacetime combination of military forces the world has ever known. The fact that such forces exist and can be set quickly in motion constitutes a form of pressure which has helped to maintain unpopular minorities of Communist conspirators in power in the Soviet satellites and in the case of the coup in Czechoslovakia undoubtedly played a large part in putting them in power. The people of Europe are frequently reminded of the nature of this weapon by carefully timed and skillfully staged displays of Soviet military power, such as the recent exhibition at Moscow of the latest model jet-powered military planes.

The fact is that the appeal of international Communism is not, contrary to the self-serving assertions of the Soviets, an appeal to the minds of men. International Communism has made its gains in Europe not by any intellectual or spiritual attractions but by the threat that derives from the existence of large forces, and the ruthless application of force wherever this has been necessary to achieve its objectives.

The mere presence of these large armed forces has had a psychological effect that has been damaging to recovery and stability, and has been a major influence in the loss of freedom and self-determination in important areas of Europe. Nor can the possibilities of direct military aggression be ignored. When political aggression fails, as it has failed so far in Western Europe, totalitarian regimes are often tempted to gain their objectives by military means, particularly when they consider that no effective resistance is possible. It is our aim to forestall that possibility by making it clear that military aggression against the na-

tions of Western Europe can be undertaken only at great cost and with no assurance of success.

It is contended by some that, in any event, there is no way to create a defense which would protect Western Europe from invasion once such an invasion had been launched. This is the counsel of despair. It is like arguing that because burglars can break into houses we should not put locks on our doors. We do not believe that to discourage military aggression it is necessary to create Western European defensive forces which are by virtue of their size capable of successfully resisting an all-out attack. What is required is rather sufficient strength to make it impossible for an aggressor to achieve a quick and easy victory. The dictators of recent times have become involved in war when, in their belief, their intended victims would fall easy prey without substantial risk to themselves. The strengthening of the defenses of Western Europe is designed to prevent a repetition of the tragic consequences of such dangerous self-deception.

I wish to be emphatic about these points I have summarized. Let me restate the situation even more bluntly. The North Atlantic Treaty provides for concerted action in defense of an area which is absolutely vital to our security interest. That common defense will cancel out an advantage which marauding nations have always had in Europe. I mean the advantage of piecemeal aggression, the technique of the *fait accompli* that dictators have used to absorb independent nations before and since World War II. The fundamental pledge of the treaty, that an attack on one signatory will mean an attack on all, closes the door to piecemeal aggression. Does this mean, then, a determined aggressor nation will take the desperate gamble of an all-out war? I do not believe that in the light of the pledge of the treaty, and with the military program now proposed, any aggressor at this time would dare to do so. We know the pattern past aggressions have taken. The gangster mind likes to gamble only on sure things. Its victims are the weak and the unprepared, and it does not relish the prospect of fighting an aroused society. An invasion of Western Europe would mean a total war in which the aggressor would be pitting its strength against the combined strength of the Atlantic pact nations. That is a choice which no nation would make unless it believed that swift military action could gain it enough usable military potential to more than balance the remaining forces arrayed against it. It is the aim of this program to insure that a successful swift and comparatively effortless military action by an aggressor would be impossible and therefore to make the gamble too hazardous to be tempting.

In this program I firmly believe we will secure a highly advantageous and lasting benefit to the United States. Since our own future is so closely entwined with the interests of other free nations,



we find that when we help them, we also help ourselves. The program has been designed for the minimum level of expenditure, which makes sense in view of the political and military objectives to be achieved. This has been achieved by careful detailed screening of every item in the program. As a result of this process, the program contains only those items which are clearly essential to the establishment of a minimum of defense—the minimum essential to the success of our efforts. It is so constituted, and will be so administered, as to assure that economic recovery will not be jeopardized.

Provided our own forces are maintained at the minimum level essential to our own security, the authorization of the sum requested will be the most positive contribution we could make to the collective security of the North Atlantic area. For this sum we will sustain the courageous efforts which Western Europe is making to achieve economic recovery, and we will prevent those efforts from being paralyzed by fear. For this sum we will have given tangible evidence that we believe that a free and prosperous world can be built despite all obstacles and discouragements.

Without such a world we cannot have lasting peace. Military assistance, added to the constructive measures we have already put into effect, is part of the price of peace. The only kind of peace acceptable to free men cannot be bought cheaply. I think the people of the United States are willing to pay the price. I believe they fully understand that failure to pay it will put in jeopardy all we have been trying to achieve at so much sacrifice, and that failure to pay now will make the price much higher in the future.

#### ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

On July 25, the Department of State released a report on the Military Assistance Program that analyzes in detail the draft legislation which the President sent to the Congress on that same date.<sup>1</sup> The report summarizes a unified, cohesive Military Assistance Program (MAP) that has been planned over the past several months, at the direction of the President, by the Department of State, the National Military Establishment, and the Economic Cooperation Administration. According to the report, such a program provides for:

“Centralized administration of military aid

<sup>1</sup> *The Military Assistance Program*, Department of State publication 3563, for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for 15 cents.

and asks that broad authority be granted to the President so that he may make aid available in critical situations. An essential part of the planning is that the Congress should authorize a single appropriation to finance all activities under the Program during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1950. This procedure will permit the most economical allocation of our limited military resources and assure that they will be made available where they are most needed and where they can be used most effectively.

“The major portion of the specific military aid proposed under the Program for fiscal 1950 will go to the North Atlantic Pact countries of Western Europe. This is a realistic emphasis calculated to meet the pressing needs of security in an area of critical importance to our national defense.”

#### Major Aims and Objectives

The report describes the three major aims of the Military Assistance Program as follows:

“*First*, to secure the means and authorization for moving swiftly to help the North Atlantic Pact countries of Western Europe, as well as other countries, to correct their dangerously unbalanced security position; *second*, to enable the Chief Executive to meet emergencies and to bring military assistance into closer working relationship with the other actions of our foreign policy; and *third*, to provide the framework for a consistent and realistic evaluation and treatment of all the requests we may receive for our military aid, whether for grant or purchase.”

The proposed legislation would carry out the objectives of the program by providing, in brief:

- “that all projects of United States military aid be brought together in one program;
- that an appropriation of 1,450 million dollars be made to cover the costs of the entire military-aid program for the fiscal year 1950;
- that most of our aid at this time go to Western Europe, an area whose importance to our security has been demonstrated in two world wars;
- that the military aid program be used to complement the North Atlantic Treaty through carrying out the principles of self-help and mutual aid; and
- that our military aid to the free nations of Western Europe take three forms: (a) a relatively small but very important amount of dollar aid to increase military-production programs of the Western European nations and thus reduce their dependence on the

<sup>2</sup> This includes 50 million dollars for Greece and Turkey previously authorized and for which an appropriation has been requested.



United States for military equipment; (b) a direct supply of arms and equipment to help accelerate the strengthening of the defensive capabilities of their military forces; and (c) the provision of United States technical and training assistance.

that the Chief Executive be given the authority to alter allocations to meet changing situations;"

#### Cost and Impact of the Program

The 1,450 million dollars appropriated for the fiscal year 1950 is allocated as follows:

|   |                  |
|---|------------------|
| A. Aid to the North Atlantic Pact countries:                            |                  |
| 1. Equipment, delivery expenses, technical and training assistance----- | \$938, 450, 000  |
| 2. Assistance to stimulate increased military production-----           | 155, 000, 000    |
| B. Aid to other countries:  |                  |
| Equipment, delivery expenses, technical and training assistance-----    | 300, 580, 000    |
| C. Emergency Fund-----  | 45, 000, 000     |
| D. Administration-----  | 10, 970, 000     |
| Total -----   | 1, 450, 000, 000 |

#### MAP and United States Policy Objectives

The report states that the meaning of national security has been "changed drastically" by the developments of the past 20 years.

"Today it is cold sober fact that this nation cannot stand alone or hope to maintain its safety by limiting its defensive efforts to actions taken within its geographic boundaries. There is no longer even the illusion of safety in withdrawing from the world, nor is safety to be found in a policy which succumbs to the intimidations of propaganda warfare. Vigorous, consecutive action in every phase of international affairs is the only possible answer to the problem of national security.

"Not even the United States, with its resources, its atomic weapons, and its great industrial power, can afford to act the hermit in national defense. In fact, a paradox of our times is that the greater and stronger a nation is, the more imperative is its need to protect in every way possible the world society from which it derives its strength. To help us neutralize the disruptive influences attacking the world society, we in the United States need friends and strong friends. We need the means of making our strength and their strength available wherever our vital common interests are threatened. Secretary of State Acheson summed up the concept in these words:

In the compact world of today, the security of the United States cannot be defined in terms of boundaries and frontiers. A serious threat to international peace and security anywhere in the world is of direct concern to this

country. Therefore it is our policy to help free peoples to maintain their integrity and independence, not only in Western Europe or in the Americas, but wherever the aid we are able to provide can be effective.

"The security problem which faces the United States and other peaceful governments is unavoidably complex. It includes economic and military assistance, individual and collective defense planning, regional arrangements, protection of sources of strategic materials, the free exchange of information and effective cooperation for cultural, scientific, and technical progress. Stripped to its essentials, the security problem calls for action along four separate but closely related lines: (1) cooperation in the United Nations for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the removal of the causes of war; (2) maintenance or recovery of economic health and political stability; (3) creation and maintenance of a defensive military establishment adjusted to the national strength and the international security situation; (4) participation in collective security arrangements with friendly governments."

#### MAP and the United Nations

In discussing the relation of MAP to the United Nations, the report describes the program as bringing about world conditions that will aid the United Nations to function more effectively by "restoring a measure of security to free nations through increasing their individual and collective ability to resist aggression." Aid extended through the program to members of the North Atlantic Treaty—

"will advance the purposes of the Charter to the extent that it will strengthen the security of the peoples in the North Atlantic area. The Program will also continue aid to Greece and thus assist that country to combat a situation which the United Nations General Assembly has found to be endangering the peace of the Balkans. Continuance under the program of aid to Turkey will be an additional benefit.

"The proposed Military Assistance Program of the United States is wholly consistent with the principles and intent of the United Nations Charter. It conforms to the requirements of articles 1, 2, 51, and 103. Any action taken under it by the Chief Executive must be consistent with our paramount obligations as a member of the United Nations. The requested legislation specifically directs the President to terminate assistance under the Program to any nation where such assistance is inconsistent with preventive or enforcement action being taken by the United Nations against that nation or where the furnishing of such assistance to any nation is no longer consistent with the policies and purposes of the Program. Through these safeguards and through the clear statement of purpose contained in the proposed

legislation, the Military Assistance Program takes its place as a positive, additional measure of United States support for the United Nations."

#### MAP and the North Atlantic Treaty

The Military Assistance Program and the North Atlantic Treaty, according to the report, are "separate and distinct." The objectives of both are, nevertheless, to—

"maintain and develop, by self-help and mutual aid, individual and collective capacity to resist aggression. A sensible and realistic interpretation of these objectives will keep in mind the three fundamentals of preparedness: manpower, equipment, and the suitable positions from which to employ them in the event of attack. The Treaty will go far toward making available for the common defense the manpower and the strategic positions; what is presently lacking in the North Atlantic partnership is the material required for defense.

"It should be kept clear that the Military Assistance Program is not a program for 'implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty.' The Program would be necessary even if there were no North Atlantic Treaty, just as the Treaty would be necessary even if the Military Assistance Program had not yet been formulated. The MAP, both in inception and conception, has its own validity and necessity, rooted in basic elements of our foreign policy. It is true that some of these elements of our foreign policy are common to those which underlie the North Atlantic Treaty. The principal element involved in both is that of the national interest of the United States in insuring the security of certain free nations."

#### Reciprocity

The report stresses that the Military Assistance Program is not intended as a "one-way flow of aid from this country." "In addition to furthering our national security," the report states,

"the Military Assistance Program encourages the recipient countries to exercise the maximum of self-reliance and to place the minimum of dependence upon the United States. The concepts of *self-help* and *mutual aid* apply to all of the recipients of military assistance from the United States. Our military aid is an expression of our fundamental policy that free peoples everywhere have identical interests and responsibilities in realizing the aims of the United Nations Charter.

"Reciprocal assistance to the United States, where it may be practicable in the light of politi-

cal, economic, and strategic considerations for the recipient nations to furnish it, might take various forms including facilitating the procurement of strategic materials, and the provision of local currency to cover certain local costs incurred by the United States in the administration of the Program."

#### MAP and the "Cold War"

The report has the following to say about MAP and the "Cold War":

"The Military Assistance Program like our membership in the North Atlantic Pact, is part of a policy which is entirely defensive in its scope. It is aimed at increasing the defense potential of those nations which have asked our aid. Through a resultant increase in confidence, it hopes to promote world recovery and especially the progress of the European recovery effort. It looks forward to a coordinated defense policy which will achieve a timely security for the North Atlantic area and which will not be susceptible to the hot-and-cold, "peace" propaganda of the Soviet Union and international communism.

"Ever since the United States initiated the Marshall Plan and the programs of aid to Greece and Turkey, the officially announced Soviet position has been that the United States was arming Western Europe with aggressive intent toward the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. According to Soviet statements and propaganda, the proposed Military Assistance Program is only a continuation and further refinement of an American program in Europe which has been in process for some years. Despite this propaganda it is abundantly clear that this Program is solely defensive in its nature and scope and does not provide any pretexts for aggression. The Soviet Union and international communism can be expected to attack the Program, just as they attacked ERP and the Atlantic Pact, for they will recognize it as a positive step to sustain the morale of free nations and to increase their resistance to Communist propaganda.

"The Military Assistance Program is a realistic program. It is not a panacea for international ills and it alone will not put an end to the "cold war", but it can become an important additional instrument in the foreign policy of the United States, and it can play a vital role in the cooperative action directed at preventing another world war. Once in effective operation, it can help preserve the initiative which the free nations of the Western World now have, and it can help to create the structure of sound economies and defensive capabilities with which it may be still possible to convince any potential aggressor nation that the ultimate welfare of its own people lies only in tolerance and peace."

## U.S.-U.K.-Canadian Economic Discussions

*Text of British Treasury Communiqué Issued on July 10, 1949*

[1]

During their visit to London, Mr. John W. Snyder, Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, and Mr. Douglas Abbott, the Canadian Minister of Finance, have had a general exchange of views with the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the President of the Board of Trade on the balance of payments difficulties between the dollar and sterling areas and on the measures which could be taken to right the existing disequilibrium between the two areas both in the long and the short term.

[2]

It was reaffirmed that the objectives of the economic policy of all three Governments remained those which are set out in the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund and the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organisation. Particular stress was laid on the necessity of finding solutions which would maintain high levels of employment and enable world trade and international payments to develop on a multilateral basis.

[3]

It was agreed that the general approach to existing problems must be based upon full recognition of their profound and long-term character. The difficulties of the past few months were no more than an aggravation of deep-seated maladjustments. All agreed that remedies other than financial assistance such as that provided by the U.S.A. and Canada must be explored.

[4]

The aim must be the achievement of a pattern of world trade in which the dollar and non-dollar countries can operate together within one single multilateral system. All parties concerned must be prepared to review their policies with this object in view.

[5]

As the next step, it is proposed that technical and fact-finding discussions should take place between the three Governments in preparation for further Ministerial discussions which it is hoped can be held in Washington early in September.

[6]

As regards immediate problems, there was a comprehensive examination of the influences which had brought about the recent acceleration in the drain on the reserves of the sterling area. This led to a general discussion in which the

United Kingdom representatives outlined the preliminary steps which they felt it necessary to take to meet the immediate situation. A number of supplementary measures were suggested which could be taken by the Governments either individually or in concert to strengthen the present position. It was agreed that they should be the subject of further consideration. In this connection no suggestion was made that sterling be devalued.

[7]

There was full recognition, in the discussions, of the vital part which assistance under the European Recovery Programme is playing in maintaining the economic position in the United Kingdom and in the other countries participating in the OEEC [Organization of European Economic Cooperation].

## Warnings to Americans In Southern China Repeated

[Released to the press July 25]

*Text of a notice transmitted on July 26 by the Office of the Embassy in Canton to Americans in the provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Fukien, Kiangsi, and Hunan:*

Reference is made to the statement issued by the American Consulate General, Canton, on November 16, 1948, warning American citizens residing in this consular district who were not prepared to remain under possibly hazardous conditions that they should plan at once to move to places of safety.<sup>1</sup> In view of the renewal of hostilities in southern China, this warning is now being repeated in order that American citizens in areas which may be affected by the renewal of hostilities in southern China may give the most serious consideration to the possible jeopardy in which they may be placed should they remain in the areas in question.

In this regard attention is called to the fact that the Chinese Communist authorities have thus far, in areas under their control, demonstrated in many cases an inability or unwillingness to afford adequate protection to foreigners or to safeguard their individual liberties, particularly in connection with arrest, detention, trial and mob action. Moreover, no satisfactory procedure has thus far been afforded foreigners wishing to secure permits for exit from China or even for travel between points in Communist-controlled China.

In view of the possibility that communications may be seriously disrupted in the near future, Americans are advised to utilize existing transportation facilities while they are still available.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 2, 1949, p. 28.



## Ambassador Grady Arrives for Consultation on Assistance to Greece

[Released to the press July 25]

Ambassador Henry F. Grady arrived from Athens on July 25 for consultations on American assistance to Greece. Following is a statement by the Ambassador concerning the situation:

Conditions in Greece are slowly but steadily improving on both the military and economic fronts. While there are still 17,000 guerrillas in Greece and while they are still getting large amounts of aid from the countries to the north of Greece, the Greek Army is steadily destroying them. Seventy percent are concentrated in the northwest corner of Greece, close to the Albanian and Yugoslav borders. There are small numbers in other parts of northern Greece, but the Peloponnesus has been completely cleared of bandits, and central Greece has been practically cleared. There is no doubt about the final victory of the Greek Army against what is to all intents and purposes an invasion from without, an invasion which is attempting to overthrow the Greek Government and make Greece another satellite of Russia.

On the economic front steady progress is being made, although naturally the continuance of fighting in Greece retards the progress toward economic rehabilitation. Much, however, has been done in the way of reconstruction with the aid of American funds, and the general economic structure of the country has been maintained intact so that with the establishment of complete security in the country, refugees will return to their homes and Greek energy and enterprise will work earnestly to rehabilitate this war-devastated country. The Greek Government is a democratic one, based on the free elections of March 1946, and is cooperating with our ECA staff in implementing the Marshall Program. Of course, everybody wants general elections as soon as it is possible to have them. If conditions had been normal in Greece, elections would have been held in 1948—2 years after the Allied-observed elections of March 1946. It should be possible to hold the elections in a matter of months if the anticipated military victories materialize. One sees real light ahead for Greece.

## Ratifications of Commercial Treaty With Italy Exchanged

[Released to the press July 26]

Ratifications of the treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with Italy were exchanged on July 26 in Rome by Ambassador James Clement Dunn for the United States and Count Carlo Sforza, Minister of Foreign Affairs, for Italy. By its own provisions, the treaty enters into force on the day on which the ratifications are exchanged.

This treaty was signed at Rome on February 2, 1948; approved by the United States Senate on June 2, 1948; and ratified by the President of the United States on June 16, 1949. The act of the Italian Parliament approving the treaty was signed by President Einaudi on June 18, 1949.

This is the first comprehensive commercial treaty which the United States has concluded with a European country since World War II and marks the resumption of commercial treaty relations with Italy which were interrupted in 1937 when the Treaty of 1871 was terminated by mutual agreement. The treaty is basically similar to treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation now in force between the United States and various other countries. It is based in general upon the principle of mutuality and is designed to govern economic intercourse between the two countries through sound and reasonable provisions responsive to the problems of present-day international economic relations.

The treaty contains provisions relating to the rights of individuals and corporations of one party in the territory of the other, the protection of persons and property, landholding, religious activities, the exchange of goods, shipping, and other matters generally covered in treaties of this kind. It also establishes standards of fair and nondiscriminatory treatment in matters relating to the establishment and operation of corporations, the expropriation of property, currency-exchange controls, and state competition with privately owned enterprises. In these respects, the treaty is in accord with the liberal principles of economic intercourse which the United States upholds and, among other things, is designed to assure an opportunity for the development of a mutually advantageous flow of capital and technology between the two countries, which is in line with the basic objectives of the Point-4 program.

Under its provisions, the treaty will remain in effect for 10 years from the day of exchange of ratifications, and will continue in force thereafter subject to termination on 1 year's notice by either government.

## Senate Approval of North Atlantic Pact

*Statement by President Truman*

*[Released to the press by the White House July 25]*

The American people value peace and freedom above all things. Our ratification of the North Atlantic pact with the overwhelming support of the Senate and the people shows our determination to preserve this peace and freedom.

This treaty is a historic step toward a world of peace, a free world, free from fear, but it is only one step. We have malice toward none. With our partners in the pact and other like-minded peoples we must, with God's help and guidance, work for peace with every means at our command. We must keep ourselves morally and materially strong. We must play our part in helping to strengthen freedom everywhere. We must work patiently and tirelessly to make the United Nations ever more effective for its great task. We must seek ever greater unity of purpose and of action in the cause of peace.

## President Quirino of the Philippines To Visit U.S.

*[Released to the press by the White House July 27]*

President Elpidio Quirino of the Republic of the Philippines has accepted the invitation of the President of the United States to visit this country and will arrive on August 8.

Since shortly before the first of the year the President has been in communication with President Quirino in an attempt to work out a mutually satisfactory time when our government would have the privilege of welcoming him to Washington. It is a matter of satisfaction to the President that this meeting will provide an opportunity for discussing a number of matters of common and continuing interest arising out of the peculiarly intimate and friendly relations between the Philippines and the United States.

The President recalls with pleasure President Quirino's visit here as Vice President in 1947, as well as the visit of the late President Manuel Roxas in 1946.

August 8, 1949

## Multilateral Diplomacy—Continued from page 169

majorities in the United Nations referred to by former Secretary Marshall when he said:

... there are no mechanical majorities at the disposal of any nation or group of nations. Majorities form quickly in support of the principles of the Charter.

These nations have an overwhelming preponderance of moral and physical force which in the end will not be denied. The foundation of collective security must be this unaggressive preponderance in the hands of the nations who sincerely support the United Nations. By this means the center of gravity of power in international relations will shift from the old catch as catch can alliance system over to the organized community of law abiding states.

The United States has undertaken unprecedented action to buttress the economic health and security of these nations, particularly those directly exposed to Soviet designs. These programs are made imperative by the situation prevailing in the world as a result of Soviet policies, but they cannot be considered in any sense as a substitute method by which the goal of universal peace can be achieved. These are transitional arrangements to meet present security needs. It is unfortunate that the East-West conflict has prevented them from being of the type contemplated in articles 106 and 107 of the Charter. It is important that these transitional arrangements should not be permitted to siphon off the forces and compulsions which support the effort to find adequate means by which permanent peace can be established through collective security. Without the United Nations universal approach which they support, these arrangements would be brittle and fragmentary, lacking the direction and focus of a permanent policy having the backing of all those nations who share with us our hope for durable peace through collective agreement.

Continued support of the United Nations as a cornerstone of United States foreign policy is a realistic approach to the realities of international affairs. It is not enough, however, to believe that historical and social forces are at work which will make collective security prevail on an appointed day. No less than the Soviets, who are not averse to giving a helping hand to the destiny which their creed holds man cannot escape, we must be prepared at all times to give the forces of collective security a nudge in the right direction. Multilateral diplomacy is at work on this task.

# Contents

## The United Nations and Specialized Agencies

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries. By Assistant Secretary Thorp . . . . .                      | 170 |
| Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement . . . . .  | 177 |
| Israeli-Syrian Armistice Evidence That Conciliation Can Be Achieved. Statement by Secretary Acheson . . . . . | 180 |
| The United States in the United Nations . . . . .   | 181 |

## General Policy

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Multilateral Diplomacy. By William Sanders . . . . .                        | 163 |
| Warnings to Americans in Southern China Repeated. . . . .                   | 197 |
| Ambassador Grady Arrives for Consultation on Assistance to Greece . . . . . | 198 |
| President Quirino of the Philippines To Visit U.S. . . . .                  | 199 |

## Treaty Information

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement . . . . .              | 177 |
| Ratifications of Commercial Treaty With Italy Exchanged . . . . . | 198 |

Page

## Treaty Information—Continued

Page

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Senate Approval of North Atlantic Pact. Statement by President Truman . . . . . | 199 |
|---|-----|

## National Security

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| U.K., U.S., Canada To Discuss Atomic Energy Information. Statement by the President . . . . . | 185 |
| Military Assistance Program Transmitted to Congress:  |     |
| Message of the President . . . . .  | 186 |
| Statement by Secretary Acheson. . . . .   | 189 |
| Analysis of the Military Assistance Program . . . . .   | 194 |

## Economic Affairs

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Alvin Anderson Named U.S. Member on Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission . . . . . | 184 |
| U.S.-U.K.-Canadian Economic Discussions . . . . .                                 | 197 |

## Occupation Matters

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Henry Parkman Named U.S. Representative on Ruhr Authority . . . . . | 185 |
|---|-----|

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| Calendar of International Meetings . . . . . | 182 |
|--|-----|

# Contributors

*William Sanders*, author of the article on Multilateral Diplomacy, is Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs.